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MARITAL TAX CONSIDERATIONS
INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAX CONSIDERATIONS
IN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE*
By G. VAN VELSOR WOLFt
CREATING THE FAMILY UNIT
Tax Benefits of Matrimony
Although recognized in different countries in quite dif-
ferent ways, the family as an economic unit seems to have
t Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B., Yale University, 1930; LL.B., Harvard
Law School, 1933.
* This article will appear as a Chapter in a forthcoming book, BASIC
ESTATE PLANNING, being compiled and edited by John Alan Appleman, Esq.,
of the Illinois Bar, to be published (copyright reserved) by The Bobbs-
Merrill Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana [final publication to
be temporarily withheld, see n. 176, p. 60].
Because the REVIEw feels that the article will be of great value to the
many attorneys whose practice or schedule does not enable them to stay
abreast of the tax field, the RFWiEw is including, as an index, a summary of
the section and subsection headings, and a list of abbreviations of the vari-
ous publications referred to and the technical terminology used.
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become entitled more recently to special, or at least new,
benefits. We are told that in some places allowances are
made or bonuses are paid for the birth of children, whether
or not in wedlock. In the United States the approach is
more subtle. The benefits are substantial, but only after
the marriage vows have been exchanged.
Contemplation of matrimony, even under a completely
valid and binding contract, is not sufficient to secure the
tax advantages allowed under our system. But once the
knot has been tied income, estate and gift tax-reducing
opportunities become available, and they continue even
after the parties voluntarily or involuntarily agree to re-
sume their separate ways.
It is inescapable that if certain minimum exemptions
are exceeded, which are the same for all individuals regard-
less of marital status, then whenever a person has income,
makes a gift, or dies leaving property of his own, a report
thereof must be filed with the appropriate District Director
of Internal Revenue. However, whether or not such person
is married makes a very considerable difference in the
amount of tax to be paid.
The split income provisions for husband and wife' are
probably familiar to every taxpayer. The marital deduc-
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
acq. Acquiesced in by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
B. T. A. United States Board of Tax Appeals Report.
Cum. Bull. Internal Revenue Cumulative Bulletin.
E. T. Estate Tax Ruling.
G. C. M. General Counsel's Memorandum.
I. R. B. Internal Revenue Bulletin.
I. R. C. Internal Revenue Code.
I. T. Income Tax Unit Ruling.
non-acq. Not acquiesced in by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Regs. United States Treasury Regulations.
Rev. Rul. Revenue Ruling.
T. C. United States Tax Court Report. In the as yet unpublished
Volumes, the cases are referred to by number.
T. C. M. United States Tax Court Memorandum Decision.
T. D. Treasury Decision.
USTC United States Tax Cases, published by Commerce Clearing
House in its Standard Federal Tax Reporter, annually, the
volumes of said Tax Reporter being designated by year,
i.e., 53-1 or 53-2.
11. R. C., Sec. 51(b).
[VOL. XIV
MARITAL TAX CONSIDERATIONS
tion under the estate taxing laws2 is undoubtedly less
familiar, and is a great deal more complicated. However,
we know in general that if the wife8 is left up to one-half
of the husband's estate in such a way that it will be taxable
in her estate upon death, unless given away or spent in the
meantime, that property will be completely free of tax upon
the husband's death.
The least familiar member of the triumvirate is the gift
tax. The amendments thereto4 under the Revenue Act of
1948 are, in conformation, very similar to the estate tax
amendments. Where a spouse gives property either to his
wife or to a third person, the husband and wife, as a family
unit, are entitled to treat such a gift as emanating one-half
from the separate ownership of each.
Timing the Marital Status
Having recognized the advantage of the combination of
the husband and wife as one type of family unit under the
tax laws,5 and before considering the specific problems of
taxation connected with the creation and the dissolution
of this unit, it might be of interest to note the importance
of timing. Here again we find the marital status gaining
special advantage.
To secure the benefits of the split income provisions
allowed under the federal income tax laws the marital
status must exist on the last day of the taxable year.' This
simply means, as a practical matter, and without consider-
ing either the weather or any emotional involvements, that
late in December is the ideal time for a wedding.
2 I. R. C., Sec. 812(e).
2 Throughout this article, for the sake of convenience it is assumed that
It is the husband who has the income, makes the gift, dies, or makes the
payment under an ante-nuptial or post-nuptial agreement or divorce decree;
but the rules are precisely the same the other way. As to alimony, see
I. R. C., Sec. 3797(a) (17).
'I. R. C., Secs. 1000(f) and 1004(a) (3).
8 For a review of some of the special pitfalls created by reason of the
existence of the family unit see text, infra, ns. 26 to 32, ps. 12-14.
1I. R. C., Sec. 51(b) (5) (A) (i). When the State where the marriage is
performed recognizes the legality thereof, the marriage is valid for income
tax purposes although a divorce may have required a wait. Rev. Rul. 29,
I. R. B. 1953-6. However, if either party dies during the taxable year, they
can still file a joint return for that year, Sec. 51(b) (4) and (5) (A) (1i).
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In fact, if a bachelor receives during the year at least
80% of his total compensation on work to which he has
devoted more than three years of his time, it appears that
prompt wedlock will bring him not only the benefits of
split income but also the right to project his income back
over the past years for both himself and his bride.7 The
same seems to be true even if such a fee is to be received
by a partnership to which he has only just recently been
admitted, and he did none of the work.'
By the same token the final decree of divorce should be
delayed until after the dawn of the new year. Unless the
parties, if living, were legally married on the last day of the
taxable year there are no consent arrangements, powers of
attorney or any other devices available for creating or pre-
serving the split income tax saving for that year no matter
how many months of the year the parties were in fact
married. However, the Tax Court has held that where the
parties have received an interlocutory decree of divorce
but must receive a final decree before the matrimonial
bonds are legally severed, they can still file a joint return
with the full benefits of split income.'
The estate tax is similar in operation. If the parties were
married at the time of death the marital deduction for
estate tax purposes is available. That deduction is not
allowable for the inheritance of either fiancees or divorcees.
The fact that the parties have long since separated and are
living apart under a written agreement providing support
rights for the wife and releasing her property rights, makes
no difference. The marital deduction is still available.' 0
As for the gift tax, the marital status is essential as of
the time of the gift; but it must also be remembered that
the provisions permitting one-half of the gift to be con-
'Hofferbert v. Marshall, 200 F. 2d 648 (4th Cir., 1952), but note any
possible change under the Revenue Code of 1954.
8 Marshall, 14 T. C. 90, aff'd 185 F. 2d 674 (3rd Cir., 1950) ; Commissioner
v. Nielson, 187 F. 2d 233 (9th Cir., 1951). The Revenue Code of 1954 may
affect the scope of these decisions; but, in any event, the benefits of Sec.
107(a) are not available unless the remuneration has been earned by an
entity of which the taxpayer becomes a member. To combine with another
in a joint venture after the other, as an individual, has already done con-
siderable work has been held not to meet the required test. Van Hook v.
United States, 204 F. 2d 25 (7th Cir., 1953), cert. den.
9 Eccles, 19 T. C. 1049 (non-acq.), aff'd 208 F. 2d 796 (4th Cir., 1953).
20 Ibid.
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sidered as made by each spouse will not apply if the donor
should become married to someone else during the same
calendar year."
Ante-Nuptial Agreements
Gift Taxes. Although the result of pure judicial legis-
lation, it is now a fact that a transfer of property in con-
sideration of marriage, or in consideration of the release of
dower or other marital rights in a spouse's property, is
considered a gift for gift tax purposes, even when constitut-
ing a part of a valid and binding ante-nuptial agreement.
It makes no difference that the wife is giving up property
or income to which she would otherwise be entitled if she
remained unmarried. To relieve a transfer from the appli-
cation of the gift tax there must be a consideration in
money's worth of benefit to the donor. Lack of donative
intent is immaterial.12 Likewise, it makes no difference
that the wife gives up all the rights that she might otherwise
acquire in her husband's property, either as wife or widow,
except the right to maintenance and support."
If the wife gives up her right to support by the husband
(except for whatever provision may be made for her under
the agreement), the situation may be quite different. The
Commissioner has ruled with respect to separation agree-
ments, and the logic is equally applicable to ante-nuptial
agreements, that the release of support rights is adequate
consideration to prevent the application of a gift tax to the
extent that the "transfer does not exceed the reasonable
value of the support rights".
14
In some cases it might be desirable to provide in the
ante-nuptial agreement for the support of the wife. If so,
the question then becomes one of allocation of value be-
tween release of support rights and release of property
rights, only the latter being subject to the gift tax, and per-
haps under such circumstances there should be two agree-
n I. R. C. 1000(f) (1) (A). As to the timing of transfers where ante-nuptial
or separation agreements are concerned, see, infra, the discussions relating
to gift and income taxes under each of these headings, ps. 8, 11 and 49.
2Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303 (1945).
13 Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U. S. 308 (1945).
" E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166.
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ments so that there can be as between the two types of
release of right "a reasonable allocation or separation by
the parties" as suggested by the Commissioner in his ruling
mentioned just above.
Gift Taxes - Timing. In any event, if any part of the
agreement involves a release of dower or marital rights in
property, the marital deduction benefits for gift tax pur-
poses, granted under the Revenue Act of 1948, should be
considered, if feasible. In computing gift taxes an exemp-
tion is allowed as to one-half of the value of the gift if the
donee "at the time of the gift" is the donor's spouse.'5 Thus,
it would seem to be logical to assume that if the actual
transfer of the property is made after marriage, the marital
deduction should be available, even though the contract is
entered into prior to the marriage.
However, that is probably not the law as it stands
today.'6 Rather, it appears that the gift is complete when
there is an enforceable obligation, and it is subject to the
tax at that moment. When the actual transfer of possession
occurs is of no significance where the transfer is the mere
performance of an existing and legally binding obligation."'
Thus, to obtain the gift tax marital deduction under the
modern day cases it will be necessary to wait until immedi-
ately after the ceremony before executing the part of the
ante-nuptial agreement relating to a release of property
rights.
Estate Taxes. Here we have, primarily, the question of
the effect on the husband's estate of a promise to make a
transfer, where the husband dies before the agreement can
be carried out. If the transfer were actually completed
prior to death the only estate tax problem would be
whether it was made in contemplation of death. It is un-
likely that in the normal case a convincing factual situation
could be presented indicating that an agreement entered
2I1. R. C., Sec. 1004(a) (3) (A).
"In Archbold, 42 B. T. A. 453 (1940), it was held that a promise to make
a gift in the future, even though enforceable, is not a present gift. But this
case seems to have been ignored in the later decisions.
17Commissioner v. Copley's Estate, 194 F. 2d 364 (7th Cir., 1952); and
also see the discussion on the similar problem in considering separation
agreements at note 153, infra, p. 49.
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into on the eve of marriage was made in contemplation
of death.
If the death of the husband precedes the transfer, the
property will naturally be includable in his estate. The
claim of the wife, to the extent that the promise of the
husband was given in consideration of the release of dower
or statutory rights in his property, cannot be taken as a
deduction in determining his taxable estate. This is true
even though the claim of the wife may be enforceable in a
court of law as a vested contract right.'"
Also of significance, under the circumstances, might be
whether or not the parties had married before the husband's
death. If so, the value of the wife's interest under the
agreement might qualify for the marital deduction and
thereby reduce the estate taxes, whether the payment was
to be outright or in trust.19
If the agreement contemplates the creation of a trust
for the wife and it is carried out, and the parties are married
for a while before the husband dies, survived by his wife,
the estate tax problems are much the same as those of any
other decedent who has created an inter vivos trust. The
property will be considered as a part of the husband's estate
for estate tax purposes depending on the extent to which
he has retained any substantial interest therein. 0
Income Taxes. The only serious income tax problems
in ante-nuptial agreements are related to the question of
whether or not the property, when transferred, acquires a
new basis for capital gain and loss purposes, or whether it
retains in the hands of the wife the same basis or "cost"
that it had when held by her husband.
Thus, when a husband transfers property to his wife,
if the transaction is a gift she must adopt as her basis the
figure representing the cost of the property to her husband.
On the other hand, if the transfer is for a full and adequate
consideration there is no gift and the property assumes a
new basis in the hands of the wife.
'I. R. C., See. 812(b).
I. R. C., Sec. 812(e) (1) (A).
20I. R. C., Sec. 811(c).
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By the same token, if the husband discharges his con-
tractual obligations under such an agreement, with prop-
erty having a lower basis in value to him than the market
value thereof at the time of transfer, and the transfer does
not amount to a gift, he has received a capital gain.
In the only case of any significance dealing specifically
with this income tax problem,2 the owner of a well-known
chain of retail stores transferred to his intended bride, in
pursuance of an ante-nuptial agreement, a goodly number
of shares of his corporation. After a later divorce from the
merchant husband, and a subsequent remarriage, the ex-
wife sold some of the stock which she had received in the
original settlement.
Diametrically opposed to the Supreme Court in the gift
tax cases, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that, for the purposes of the income tax, a promise to marry
and a release of dower interests constitute adequate con-
sideration. Having received the stock for a valuable con-
sideration, the taxpayer obtained a new basis therefor equal
to the consideration paid.22
Also, it was evidently the court's opinion that the value
of what the prospective wife contributed, and the considera-
tion for the husband's promise, namely, her promise to
marry and the release of her property rights in his estate
2 Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F. 2d 812 (2nd Cir., 1947).
Consistent with the conclusion in this case are the holdings in Patino, 13
T. C. 816, aff'd 186 F. 2d 962 (4th Cir., 1950), and Gardner Trust, 20 T. C.
... , No. 125 (1953), dealing with separation agreements.
The opinion in Farid-Es-Sultaneh, ibid, expressly denied the reasoning
and refused to follow the Supreme Court gift tax decisions in Wemyss and
Merrill, supra, ns. 12 and 13. However, actually the holding may not be as
peculiar, or as inconsistent with the gift tax cases, as many writers Indicate.
The expectant wife released all rights "including the right to her support
to which she otherwise would have been entitled as a matter of law when
she became his wife". The release of support rights is sufficient considera-
tion to avoid the gift tax. If further analyzed, perhaps the facts would
show that Miss Farid received no more than what she could have expected
as support alone, in view of her husband's wealth and their joint life
expectancies.
The confusion and difficulties attendant to determinations of how much,
if any, consideration is being given for release of support rights would be
eliminated by the American Law Institute which proposes in Sec. X257
of the February 1954 Draft of its suggested Federal Income Tax Statute that
no gain or loss be recognized with respect to property transferred under
any marital settlement be it by ante-nuptial or separation agreement or
under a decree.
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after marriage, were precisely equal to the value of the
stock received by her at its then current market.
Although not discussed, since that case was considering
the subsequent sale of the transferred securities, it must be
remembered by the planner that if the transfer is sufficient
to cause the wife to obtain a new basis, then it is equally
a "sale or transfer" by the husband which would subject
him to capital gain or loss considerations.23
Income Taxes - Timing. The taxable gain in such a
case would be limited in any event by the statutory maxi-
mum, 25 per cent for property held more than six months,
and so, for substantial settlements, the matter of timing
would be immaterial.
In the remaining cases it would undoubtedly be prefer-
able to have the execution of the agreement and the transfer
of the property within the same taxable year as the mar-
riage, since it is the marital status on the last day of the
taxable year which controls as to whether the benefits of
the split income are available.
Summary - Ante-Nuptial Agreements
The transfer of property by one party to another in an-
ticipation or consideration of a subsequent marriage will
undoubtedly subject the transferor to the operation of the
gift tax, at least where property rights are relinquished.
If the wife releases her support rights then, to that extent,
there is no gift.
Since, as the present trend of the cases now seems to
indicate, a gift will be considered as having been made at
the time of the execution of the contract, it would be pref-
erable if possible, wherever the transfer is to be made in
exchange for a release of property rights, to sign the agree-
ment as well as make the transfer immediately after the
marriage ceremony, rather than before, so that the benefit
of the marital deduction would be available.
As the income tax picture is cloudy, at least where the
consideration is a release of dower or property rights, it
23 In cases involving a transfer in exchange for a release of the wife's
right of support, any capital gain is taxable. Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.
2d 986 (3rd Cir., 1941), cert. den.; Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F. 2d 642
(2nd Cir., 1942), cert. den.
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would undoubtedly be preferable to have the husband trans-
fer property having a current market value approximately
equal to his adjusted basis.
If a gift, property having a basis higher than current
market value should not be used in the settlement. No
benefit of the loss could be taken by anyone since, in deter-
mining capital gains and losses, the wife's basis would be
the lower of the basis to her husband, as adjusted, and the
value of the property at the time of transfer. 4
For income tax purposes the husband cannot take a loss
on a transfer to his wife.25 However, if the agreement is
entered into before the ceremony she is not then his wife
and the loss should be allowable.
If, by the agreement, the wife is to release her rights
to support accruing from the marriage, or even if she is
merely releasing prospective property rights and the view
of the Second Circuit is to be followed, there would be some
capital gain tax on the appreciated value of any property
transferred, and the use of property with a comparatively
low adjusted basis should be avoided.
Furthermore, if the view of the Second Circuit were not
followed, there would also be presented the question of
allocation. That is, what part of the consideration is to
be for a release of support rights and what part for a re-
lease of property rights. Thus, where there is to be a release
of support rights as well as a release of property rights,
two separate agreements might be advisable, each treating
one problem and setting forth the separate consideration
therefor.
USE OF THE FAMILY UNIT
Pitfalls to Watch
Not being completely blind to the ease of maneuver-
ability in family matters, the taxing laws, through both
Congressional and judicial legislation, have adopted cer-
tain arbitrary rules or limitations on transactions which
'I. R. C., Sec. 113(a) (2).
0I. R. C., Sec. 24(b) (1) (A).
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apply only in intra-family matters. Both eyes must be kept
open to avoid falling into any of the traps.
A loss on the sale of a capital asset by the husband to
his wife, even where he sells securities through an organ-
ized stock exchange and she simultaneously buys the same
issues, will not be allowed."6 In the case of a sale of a de-
preciable asset between husband and wife, or between an
individual and his family corporation, any gain is taxable
as ordinary income and not as a capital gain.2
Where a trust is set up by a husband or father for the
benefit of a member of his family, that is, for the benefit
of a person for the support of whom the settlor is under a
legal duty to provide, such as a wife28 or minor child, the
settlor will be taxed on the entire income where it must
be used for such support,29 or on the part that is so used
if there is a discretion, ° and the corpus will be included
in his taxable estate.3" The personal holding company
provisions in the tax laws are related to family unit con-
siderations.
Also, as is apparent in reviewing the cases under family
partnerships and leases, which are discussed later in this
article, many arrangements fail where entered into within
a single family group primarily because the courts have
required for such dealings an absolute assurance of busi-
nesslike and clearly demonstrable arm's length treatment
in order to overcome the natural suspicion that the whole
plan is a devious cloak over a simple intra-family gift. In
other words, wherever members of a family are involved in
a business deal, the entire matter will be subject to very
close scrutiny.
" McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 694 (1947).
2I7. R. C., Sec. 117(o).
Except under a divorce or legal separation, discussed, infra, p. 25 et seq.
Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate, 205 F. 2d 298 (2nd Cir., 1953), cert.
den.
"I. R. C., Sec. 167 (c).
Helvering v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 111 F. 2d 224
(8th Cir., 1940), cert. den. However, where the income only could be used
for the support of -the wife or child, but not controlled by the grantor as
trustee, the corpus of the trust would not be subject to the estate tax, Com-
missioner v. Douglass' Estate, 143 F. 2d 961 (3rd Cir., 1944). The same is
true also where any invasion is subject to a fixed standard, Estate of Wilson,
13 T. C. 869, aff'd 187 F. 2d 145 (3rd Cir., 1951).
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Sometimes the result of an attempted tax saving through
a family unit operation can be tragic. A discarded and
divorced wife, earning a modest living for herself, has been
held personally liable for very substantial deficiencies in
the joint income tax return which she innocently filed with
her former husband, relating to matters about which she
herself had absolutely no knowledge.2 It was his business
and he had vanished, but she was required to make good the
default since she had signed the return. The same could
happen with joint gift tax returns.
However, the advantages of the many arrangements
available to a family unit are so great, particularly in the
fields of saving or avoiding unnecessary income and estate
taxes, that the estate planner is given wide opportunities
to render a valuable service to those who desire to pre-
serve what they can of their estates for their families and
descendants . 3
Family Partnerships
Since 1942 and the advent of the high income tax rates,
continuing efforts have been made to spread the income of
the earner among as many taxing units as possible in order
to keep as much of the income as possible in the lower
brackets. One of the most popular devices has been the
family partnership.
The Revenue Act of 1948 with its split income and estate
marital deduction provisions pretty well eliminated the tax
saving value of a family partnership between husband and
wife. However, the principle is still important and of great
benefit when employed in the case of a cooperative business
enterprise with children, or with trusts for children, or with
other members of the family.
In view of the confusion in the cases, of which there
were legion, even after repeated review by the Supreme
Jones, 12 T. C. M. 470 (1953).
1 Gifts of stock, life insurance or other property to minors, either outright
or in trust, as well as the use of reciprocal trusts by husband and wife, now
declared estate tax free by Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 874
(3rd Cir., 1953), also form a part of the tax savings picture through the
family unit.
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Court,34 the Congress lent its assistance through the Reve-
nue Act of 1951.
Up to that time, in brief, the courts had required that
a child would have to contribute either "vital services" or
"original capital" to the enterprise if it was to be hoped that
the income would be taxed to anyone other than the father.
The capital interest could not be a gift from the managing
partner. It had to represent independent capital, or the
donee had to perform active services.
By Code definition now a person may be recognized as
a partner who "owns a capital interest in a partnership
in which capital is a material income-producing factor",
whether or not received as a pure gift. 5 But the courts will
undoubtedly require that the evidence clearly indicate that
the alleged partners do in fact own, and have the power to
exercise unrestricted dominion over, that interest.
The other new partnership section of the Code36 pro-
vides that where an interest in a family partnership has
been created by gift, the distributive share of the donee
shall be taxed to him rather than to the donor, except (1)
that a reasonable allowance must first be made from the
partnership profits to compensate the donor for services
rendered by him to the partnership, and (2) that the earn-
ings attributed to the donee's capital cannot be greater in
proportion than the earnings attributed to the donor's re-
tained capital. The statute further provides that the dis-
tributive share of a partner shall not be diminished because
of absence due to military service; and that any purchase
of an interest in a partnership by one member of a family
from another shall be considered an interest created by gift.
As a result of these statutory changes the partnership
law has been brought a little more realistically into line
with the long standing law relating to closely held family
corporations in which shares of stock, and thus percentages
"Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946), and Lusthaus v. Com-
missioner, 327 U. S. 293 (1946), subsequently followed by Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733 (1949).
I. R. C., Sec. 3797(a) (2).
I. R. C., Sec. 191. See, also, the related provisions in the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954.
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of earnings, can be transferred to minors who are separately
taxed thereon.
The first requirement which must be met in order to
obtain the benefit of the new provisions relating to family
partnerships is that the gift of the partnership capital in-
terest be complete and irrevocable." No current or rever-
sionary interest can be retained in the property, and every-
thing must be done that can be done to vest ownership in
the donee, although the retention of the supervision or
management in the donor for the benefit of the group will
not destroy the intended effect."
Likewise, it is obvious from the existence of such statu-
tory requirements as capital being "a material income-
producing factor", and valid distributions of earnings being
recognized only after the payment first of "reasonable com-
pensation" to the donor, that there are still very knotty
problems to be ironed out in family partnership cases.3 9
Nevertheless, the family partnership appears to be an
increasingly more attractive and manageable vehicle to
reduce taxes for persons who have businesses that are not
strictly personal service. In addition to the estate tax sav-
ings, there is the opportunity to split income with other
members of a family whom the donor might otherwise be
supporting, thereby having the aggregate income taxed in
lower brackets.
In this connection the estate planner might well con-
sider the use of trusts for the interests of minor children.
It is true that some partnerships with minor children own-
87Regs. 118, Sees. 39.191-1 and 2. The principles adopted in Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940), will undoubtedly be controlling, that is, does
the donor, or the donee, have actual dominion and control over the given
interest. Approval will perhaps also require meeting the tests of the Cul-
bertson case, supra, n. 34, that "the partners really and truly intended to
join together for the purposes of carrying on a business".
8Visintainer v. Commissioner, 187 F. 2d 519 (10th Cir., 1951), cert. den.
This involved gifts of sheep from a herd managed by donor, to his minor
children. Although not exactly a family partnership case, nevertheless the
rationale is probably very similar to the treatment that may be expected
of partnerships under the new law. To the same effect is McQuown, 12
T. C. M. 654 (1953).
,*For a more complete and analytical treatment of the family partnership
under the Revenue Act of 1951, see Schulman, 1953 Taxes, The Tax Maga-
zine, 447.
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ing outright interests have been recognized,40 but the obvi-
ous infirmities in such a plan cannot be ignored.4' On the
other hand trusts will be recognized as separate entities
in a partnership enterprise, although at times corporate
fiduciaries and others hesitate to assume the responsibilities
of a partner, as distinguished from that of a corporate share-
holder.
In several favorable decisions the donor has made him-
self trustee for his minor children and retained absolute
and complete control over the partnership and the trust
interests." In each case the court has sustained the arrange-
ment in saying that the donor had divested himself of all
personal economic benefit or interest in the trust estate, or
in the income. And in one of the cases the court stated that
the new Regulations of the Commissioner do not "adhere
to the position that there is an absence of required business
purpose" if a gift does not necessarily benefit the business.
The requirement that there be a business purpose has been
eliminated. The principal question now is - was there a
completed gift?
In the normal case it would be preferable to use an out-
side trustee, unrelated to the donor in any way, for better
assurance of success. The courts emphasize this independ-
ence and responsibility wherever it exists.43
On the other hand, the use of independent corporate
trustees will not prevent the non-recognition of family part-
nerships where the proof is not clear that the gifts to the
donees are absolute and complete. The donee must have
the power to act independently, and with at least some
control over the interest.44 However, it is also possible that
some of the recent decisions, which found a lack of business
'
0 Arnold v. Green, 186 F. 2d 18 (5th Cir., 1951), and Culbertson v. Com-
missioner, 194 F. 2d 581 (5th Cir., 1952).
,1 Children not recognized as real partners. Batman v. Commissioner, 189
F. 2d 107 (5th Cir., 1951), cert. den.; even where guardian appointed,
Giffen v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 188 (9th Cir., 1951), cert. den.
t2 Armstrong v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 700 (10th Cir., 1944) ; Henslee v.
Whitson, 200 F. 2d 538 (6th Cir., 1952) ; Miller v. Commissioner, 203 F. 2d
350 (6th Cir., 1953).
Sultan, 18 T. C. 715 (1952, non-acq.) ; Brodhead, 18 T. C. 726 (1952,
non-acq.) ; both cases affirmed (9th Cir., 1954), citations unavailable on
going to press.
"Toor v. Westover, 200 F. 2d 713 (9th Cir., 1952), cert. den.; Solomon v.
Commissioner, 204 F. 2d 562 (4th Cir., 1953) ; West, 19 T. C. 808 (1953).
19541
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
purpose fatal, might conclude differently if presented under
the new law.45
Summary - Family Partnerships. In essence the new
Code provisions added by the Revenue Act of 1951 har-
monize in a workable way the precepts that income from a
property right or interest is taxable to the owner thereof,
and income attributable to services rendered is taxable to
the one who actually performs such services.
This does not mean that a father, as donor, cannot re-
tain the managing control of a family partnership. It simply
means that the purported ownership of any donated part-
nership interest will be carefully examined to determine
true dominion and control, and whether the donor exercises
his retained managerial dominance for himself, or as a
fiduciary.
In any event full payment must be made to the donor
for his services rendered, and, where profits are to be allo-
cated to the respective capital interests, the share allocated
to a donated interest can be less, proportionately, but not
greater, than that allocated to the donor's retained interest.
Developments in further defining and applying the statu-
tory requirement of "reasonable compensation" to the donor
will be of great assistance in helping to resolve a very diffi-
cult problem in the related field of reasonable compensa-
tion for corporate executives. Up to now the Commissioner
has enjoyed uninhibited freedom in attacking the salary
scale of officers in various types of corporations.
Little that he has argued in one case could be used
against him in another, thus allowing the possibility of
irresponsibility at administrative levels, unless carefully
guarded.,, Whereas the Commissioner has heretofore been
invariably contending for smaller salaries, now, with the
new family partnership statute, he will have to consider in
many cases insisting on a higher salary for a managing part-
ner, and, perhaps as a result, a little more tangible set of
rules may eventually develop in this field of executive
compensation.
11 Cochran, 10 T. C. M. 675, aff'd 201 F. 2d 365 (9th Cir., 1952), cert. den.;
Schallerer v. Commissioner, 203 F. 2d 100 (7th Cir., 1953), cert. den.
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Gift and Lease-Back
Another method of spreading income within the family
unit, thereby reducing income taxes, and at the same time
reducing estate taxes, is the gift and lease-back. Through
this arrangement a gift, usually of real estate, is made to
another member of the family. A contract is thereupon
entered into whereby the use of the property is secured to
the donor over a fixed term of years. Where successfully
arranged, the rent paid for the use of the property over the
stipulated period is a deductible business expense for in-
come tax purposes.
If the gift of the property is outright, and any lease-back
arrangement is demonstrably separate and distinct from,
and substantially independent of, the gift, the assurance of
approval by the Commissioner is naturally greater. On the
other hand, where the gift and lease-back appear to be
constituent parts of a single transaction, where the rental
is high or there is no apparent business purpose, or where
the donor retains too complete a dominion and control over
the purportedly transferred property during the negotia-
tion, the maneuver will fail.
Thus, if property is irrevocably transferred to a com-
pletely independent corporate trustee, exclusively for the
benefit of the donor's children, and the trustee then leases
the property back to the donor, the donor's payments for
rent are business deductions and the reduction thereby
made in his business income is paid over to and spread
among the children at lower tax rates. Such an arrange-
ment has been approved even where the donor has reserved
the right to rent the premises, "at a rental to be determined
by the trustee", and apparently as a part of the same trans-
action the trustee did rent, at a reasonable figure, to the
donor for ten years.4
The factor upon which the courts place their greatest
reliance is the independence of, and the showing of actively
assumed responsibility by, the donee or trustee. The rental
payments under a lease-back arrangement after gift were
Skemp v. Commissioner, 165 F. 2d 598 (7th Cir., 1948). See also, Felix,
21 T. C ... , No. 90 (1954).
1954]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
approved as business expenses in a case where property
vital to the parents' partnership operation was transferred
to a trust pursuant to an understanding that the exclusive
use of the property would thereupon be granted to the
donors for a considerable period."7
However, as in all family transactions, these arrange-
ments are carefully scrutinized, and where rentals are too
high or commitments are made which are unbusinesslike
and would never have been made with third parties,48 or
where the donor, as a practical matter, never gives up his
continuing control over the property,49 the courts have had
no hesitancy in disallowing the deduction.
Family Annuities
A third type of arrangement, albeit much more danger-
ous in its consequences and in most cases downright in-
advisable as a practical matter, is the family annuity. The
attraction here is two-fold: lower taxes and more income.
Also, the transfer inter vivos of property to the natural
objects of one's bounty is normally restricted by the fact
that the donor does not wish to become dependent upon
another.
If the donor makes the transfer in consideration of regu-
lar monthly or annual payments by the donee, he will
thereby make the desired saving in estate taxes, incur no
gift taxes, and at the same time receive a higher income
after taxes during the remainder of his lifetime because
of the Code provision which permits the receipt of an
annuity income tax free over and above an amount equal
to three per cent of the cost. 0
A simple example would be the transfer by a father to his
son of cash or property in the amount or value of $100,000
under an agreement whereby the son would agree to pay
" Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F. 2d 926 (3rd Cir., 1950), cert. den.
Is Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F. 2d 531 (5th Cir., 1951).
'4 White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F. 2d 398 (2nd Cir., 1951), cert. den.; Rev. Rul.
54-9, I. R. B. 1954-2; but also cf. Stearns Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,
208 F. 2d 849 (7th Cir., 1954), where the court approved the arrangement
even though there was no apparent business purpose other than the saving
of taxes.
10 I. R. C., Sec. 22(b) (2) (A). The Revenue Code of 1954, as submitted,
contains provisions which would change some of the special features of
annuities.
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him a certain income a year for life. The father would have
to pay an income tax on only $3,000 annually for many
years, that is, until his non-taxable receipts equal the cost
of what he paid out to purchase his annuity.
There would be no gift tax. The property would escape
the estate tax. The father would not even have to pay a
capital gain tax at the time of creation of the annuity if
he should transfer appreciated property to his son. The
promise of an individual, no matter whether rich or poor,
to make continuous payments has no ascertainable value,
and so there can be no capital gain or loss51 upon the incep-
tion of the obligation."
However, the difficulties with such a scheme are first
of all that it must be worked out with a reasonably busi-
nesslike effect as the objective. In the above case if the son
could invest the fund at an income which would approxi-
mate the amount he has agreed to pay out, he would prob-
ably be considered as nothing but a trustee for his father.
If the arrangement is such that the father would never
have given away his property to a stranger under similar
circumstances, the plan would not be recognized as an
annuity for income tax purposes.5" In fact, the property
could even be subject to estate taxes in the father's estate,
as being a transfer with the right to income being retained, 4
and also subject, at least in part, to gift taxes.55
So, in order to create a family annuity acceptable to the
Commissioner it would have to have a seriously actuarial
appearance. But, assuming that could be accomplished
satisfactorily, there are other practical drawbacks.
First of all the son gets no income tax credit or deduc-
tion of his own for the payments he makes annually to his
father, until he has paid out the full value of the principal
received as the purchase price. He cannot even consider
any part of his payments as interest." If he already has
11 No capital gains - Commissioner v. Kann's Estate, 174 F. 2d 357 (3rd
Cir., 1949) ; no loss - Evans v. Rothensies, 114 F. 2d 958 (3rd Cir., 1940).
1 The discussion of annuities in the text is based on the present law, with-
out consideration of proposals in the Revenue Code of 1954.
Evans v. Rothensies, supra, n. 51.
I. R. C., Sec. 811 (c) (1) (B) (i).
Bartman, 10 T. C. 1073 (1948).
Gillespie & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 154 F. 2d 913 (10th Cir., 1946),
cert. den. However, the Revenue Code of 1954 may change this.
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substantial income of his own there will be little additional
net income left from which to make his payments, unless
he can protect himself by investing the fund in tax-exempt
securities.
Likewise, as with the father, the son will have no capital
gain tax to pay at the inception of the arrangement; and
if the son can prove that he entered into the arrangement
as a business venture, he will be entitled to deduct in full,
as a tax loss suffered in a transaction entered into for profit,
all payments made over and above the value of the con-
sideration received for the purchase of the annuity. But, if
the father dies before the son has paid out in the aggregate
a sum equal to the full value of the purchase price, the son
will be taxed on the difference as having received ordinary
income.57
As for the income tax position of the father in a normal
case, the law seems to be clearly settled, at least under the
existing tax laws relating to annuities, that he will pay a
tax on 3% of the value of the consideration he transferred
as the purchase price of his annuity, assuming his annual
receipts are at least that much.
After the father has recouped from his non-taxable in-
come an amount equal to his adjusted basis of the property
he transferred to purchase the annuity, he will pay a capital
gains tax each year, in addition to the annual income tax at
3% as above, until his annual receipts over and above his
income taxable figure aggregate an amount equal to the dif-
ference between his adjusted cost and the value of the
property at the time it was transferred as the purchase
price. Thereafter he will be taxable on his entire receipts
as ordinary income.5"
There are many additional tax problems as yet still
unsettled. 9 Actually, for instance, there is no agreement
among the courts as to how the cost to the obligor [son] of
an annuity shall be determined for capital gain purposes.
Sheridan. 18 T. C. 381 (1952, acq.) ; I. T. 1242, I-1 Cum. Bull. 61.
Hill's Estate v. Maloney, 58 F. Supp. 164 (D. C., N. J., 1944) ; Rev. Rul.
239, I. R. B. 1953-23.
5 For full and helpful discussions on the whole subject of family annuities
see Smith, 1952 Taxes, The Tax Magazine, 995; Burks, 1952 S. Cal. Tax
Inst. Proc., p. 225.
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Some courts accept what is known as the "annuity venture"
theory, others the "capital expenditure" theory. Under
"annuity venture" the consideration received is the factor
in cost. Under "capital expenditure" it is the amount paid
out, with the result that the obligor never knows his cost
until the annuitant dies.
If "capital expenditure" is to be adopted generally, and
there is considerable support therefor,"° then (1) what
would be the cost to the annuitant father of the annuity on
which the 31% rule would operate, since the cost would not
necessarily be the value of the property transferred, and
the balance would be subject to the gift tax; and (2) what
would be the basis of the property in the hands of the
obligor son in the event he should sell it before the father's
death, or if it is property subject to depreciation?6
It would also be appropriate here to raise a danger
signal. Although private annuities may be desirable at
times, care must be taken not to fall unsuspectingly into
the trap of private annuity treatment on the sale of property.
Equal periodic payments for life, given in consideration
for the conveyance of property, create an annuity. It makes
no difference that the agreement is written as a simple sale
of real estate, or that the purchaser has not qualified under
state law to sell annuities. The receipts in excess of cost
are taxed as ordinary income and not capital gain.62
DISSOLVING THE FAmILY UNIT
Death
The family unit between spouses is obviously terminated
upon the death of either. The allowance of the marital de-
duction under the federal estate tax law,63 and the split
income provisions,64 illustrate clearly the advantages of
being married at death.
O Steinbach Kresge Co. v. Sturgess, 33 F. Supp. 897 (D. C., N. J., 1940).
See also, G. C. M. 11655, XII-1 Cum. Bull. 159.
02 Ware v. Commissioner, 159 F. 2d 542 (5th Cir., 1947) ; see also Bodine
v. Commissioner, 103 F. 2d 982 (3rd Cir., 1939), cert. den.
0I. R. C., Sec. 812(e).
6 Which are available even though one spouse dies during the taxable
year, I. R. C., Sec. 51(b) (4).
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Separation or Divorce
The other standard method of terminating the husband-
wife team is through separation or divorce. The emotions,
enmities and recriminations between the principals are
often at a high and bitter pitch at this time, and the estate
planner's role is therefore doubly difficult. No matter how
perplexing the negotiations as to fault, support and custody
become, the concomitant tax problems are of at least equal
complexity.
After a long period of recognition that alimony pay-
ments were not taxable income to the wife,65 the Congress
adopted in 1942 several amendments to the law which have
in effect reversed that basic concept. 66 However, the exist-
ing statutes are so carefully imbued with limitations, both
statutory and administrative, to prevent tax avoidance to
too great a degree, that the cases dealing with the various
aspects of the problem are almost countless, and the true
rules are difficult, if not impossible, in many instances to
recognize with any degree of clarity.
The rules vary, not only depending upon how an agree-
ment for the payment of alimony is reached, or a court
decree granting alimony is rendered, but also depending
upon whether payments are in cash or the use of property,
periodic or lump sum, and whether paid by the husband
directly or through an annuity or trust, or even through
life insurance.
Of perhaps even greater significance is the question of
whether the payments by the husband to the wife are to
satisfy her rights to support and maintenance, or whether
they are made in consideration of her release of her dower
and other prospective marital rights in the property of the
husband at the time of his death. However, one thing seems
certain. For tax considerations it apparently makes no
difference whether it is the husband or the wife who ulti-
mately obtains the divorce.
Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151 (1917).
eI. R. C., Secs. 22(b) (2) (A), 22(k), 23(u), 25(b)(3), 171 and 3797-
(a) (17).
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Alimony Payments - Income Taxes
Undoubtedly the tax problem of greatest importance,
since it recurs every year, is that involving the degree to
which alimony is taxed to the wife, and the extent to which
the husband is entitled to an income tax deduction therefor.
In planning the dissolution of the husband-wife unit
the income, gift and estate tax consequences of each aspect
of a separation, whether by agreement or otherwise, must
be realized and analyzed. Under some lines of approach
there are shifted to or created in the wife certain tax liabili-
ties of which the planner must be aware so that the wife
can be warned. At the same time the husband may receive
no compensating relief from taxes. Of incidental interest,
perhaps, it might be mentioned here that if the husband has
been divorced more than once he may have several sets of
alimony deductions,67 and in a community property state
a subsequent wife in her separate return is entitled to take
as a deduction one-half of the alimony payments by her
husband to his former spouse as her community share
thereof.6
Decree Necessary. What amount to split income tax pro-
visions, requiring alimony under certain circumstances to
be taxed to the wife and, if so, permitting income tax deduc-
tions to the husband,69 were adopted six years before the
split income tax and marital deduction provisions of the
Revenue Act of 1948. However, they were not amended to
conform to the philosophy of that new law.
As a result, the parties cannot in effect file a joint return
as to alimony payments, with the husband getting the
benefit of having his wife share in the tax, unless they are
"Hesse, 5 T. C. M. 781 (1946).
Is Commissioner v. Newcombe, 203 F. 2d 128 (9th Cir., 1953).
6I. R. C., Secs. 22(k) and 23(u) which provide in brief that periodic
alimony payments received by a wife who is divorced or legally separated
under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, where the payments are
required to be made under the terms of a decree or written agreement
incident to a decree, are taxable to the wife as ordinary income, and are
to the same extent deductible by the husband on his income tax return.
The payments are taxable to the wife as such regardless of whether they
represent principal or income, and even where they are paid by a guarantor
or surety of the husband, for which there would be no compensating deduc-
tion. Luckenbach v. Pedrick, 116 F. Supp. 268 (D. C., N. Y., 1953).
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divorced or legally separated "under a decree of divorce or
of separate maintenance".
No matter how completely the husband and wife may
have gone their separate ways, nevertheless, without a de-
cree, any support payments made by the husband to the
wife are not within the alimony tax provisions of the law.
Nor will the situation be cured by the entering of a decree
of divorce nunc pro tunc as of an earlier time when a decree
could have been granted. ° But also it must be remembered
that when the decree is once entered the husband is no
longer entitled to consider payments to the wife, for sup-
port, as made for the support of a dependent.7'
Type of Decree. The parties must be "divorced or legally
separated". For this purpose a partial divorce, from bed and
board, is as effective as an absolute divorce.72 But a court
order for support is not.73
As for an annulment, if it voids the marriage ab initio
a decree therefor is not sufficient to make available to the
husband a tax deduction for any support payments made
thereafter. However, if, according to the law of the par-
ticular locale, the annulment voids the marriage as of the
date of the decree instead, and is in practical effect similar
70 Smith v. Commissioner, 168 F. 2d 446 (2nd Cir., 1948) ; Daine v. Com-
missioner, 168 F. 2d 449 (2nd Cir., 1948). Likewise, no deduction where no
decree, in spite of written approval of separation agreement by the court,
Portfolio v. U. S., 54-1 USTC 9192 (Ct. Cl., 1954). But, since husband and
wife now enjoy split income tax benefits anyway, the reason for requiring a
court decree in order to obtain the alimony tax benefits no longer exists.
There is no further danger that the parties might separate formally to
obtain a split income tax advantage. The American Law Institute, in its
Federal Income Tax Statute, February 1954 Draft, does not require a de-
cree; see discussion at page 263 of Draft.
71 I. R. C., Sec. 25(b) (3). However, Sec. 71 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 [H. R. 8300], pending before the Congress at the time of publication
hereof, would eliminate the necessity of a decree of divorce or of separate
maintenance; a written separation agreement would be sufficient. If such
a change is ultimately adopted a great deal of illogical and unnecessary law
on this subject of alimony payments as income tax deductions could be
eliminated from consideration. Such an amendment might well reduce the
discussion herein with reference to the necessity of a decree, the type of
decree, the requirement that the separation agreement be incident to a de-
cree, and the amendment of an agreement after a decree, as being no longer
significant.
" Wick, 7 T. C. 723, aff'd 161 F. 2d 732 (3rd Cir.. 1947).
78Kalchthaler, 7 T. C. 625 (1946) ; Gerrish, 12 T. C. M. 594 (1953). Nor
is an order of a commanding officer of the Marine Corps even though failure
to comply therewith would result in serious disciplinary action, Jodoin, 12
T. C. M. ... (1953).
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to a divorce, then such a decree will be sufficient to grant
the husband his deduction.74
Whether or not an interlocutory decree is sufficient is
presently somewhat confused.75 It is probable that where
the decree terminates the marital status and the parties
merely have to wait for a fixed period before validly con-
tracting another marriage in the same jurisdiction, the pay-
ments are deductible by the husband.
On the other hand, it has been held that where the decree
itself does not become final, and the marital status does not
change as a practical matter for either party, until entry of
the final decree, no deduction is allowed. 76 Consistently
therewith it has been held that during such period the par-
ties can file a joint income tax return.77
The decree need not be valid in any jurisdiction other
than that granting it. Assuming that it could be successfully
attacked and declared void in another jurisdiction, or even
in the state where the parties have always lived, such as a
Mexican divorce or an American divorce granted on a mini-
mum period of residence and no appearance by the other
spouse, nevertheless, if the parties acted upon it "in good
faith" the alimony tax requirements have been satisfied.7 s
Divorce Immediately. In addition to the significance of
the requirement that any agreement be "incident" to a
decree of divorce or separation, as discussed later, the time
of seeking the divorce is all important. Only payments
"received subsequent to such decree" will qualify. Thus,
a husband will get no deduction for payments made before
the divorce case is instituted, or where the payments are
made under a decree which is merely pendente lite.79
Necessity of a Writing. Except for the relatively few
instances where the alimony payments are to be made from
certain types of trusts, ° they must be made in pursuance
7' Reighley, 17 T. C. 344 (1951).
I. T. 3761, 1945 Cum. Bull. 76, and I. T. 3934, 1949-1 Cum. Bull. 54, both
dealing with California interlocutory decrees.
Evans, 19 T. C. 1102 (1953, non-acq.).
Eccles, 19 T. C. 1049 (non-acq.), aff'd 208 F. 2d 796 (4th Cir., 1953).
G. C. M. 25250, 1947-2 Cum. Bull. 32; Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198
F. 2d 260 (3rd Cir., 1952).
Wick, 8upra, n. 72; McKinney, 16 T. C. 916 (1951).
80 I. R. C., Sec. 171(a), and see text, infra, ns. 135 to 140, ps. 41-44.
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of a decree or "under a written instrument". If the pro-
visions for such payments are included in the decree of
divorce or separate maintenance there is no problem, re-
gardless of whether or not the parties had reached any
separate agreement thereon.
However, if no mention thereof is made in the decree,
the agreement as to alimony payments must exist at the
time of the decree and must be clearly decipherable from
one or more paper writings. A husband is not entitled to
the deduction where there is only an oral agreement, even
if the court is told that the husband will stick to it and there
is no need to put anything in the decree."' On the other
hand, a letter clearly setting out an offer to make support
payments, and its acceptance, even though not in writing,
is sufficient.82
Payments Must Be For Support. The statutory pro-
visions under consideration were designed to allow income
tax deductions to a husband who makes payments to his
wife for her support, if certain formal requirements are
satisfied. It was not intended that payments in discharge
of business obligations should be so treated, merely because
incorporated in a separation agreement or divorce decree;
and no deductions will be allowed therefor. 3
However, it was held in one case that payments made
direct to a mother-in-law under a separation agreement
approved by a divorce decree were deductible by the hus-
band.84 The decision seems highly questionable, even though
the payments were for her support.
Support Obligation Must Exist At Time. To qualify, the
payments must be "in discharge of a legal obligation which,
"IMyerson, 10 T. C. 729 (1948).
a Jefferson, 13 T. C. 1092 (1949, acq.) ; Campbell, 15 T. C. 355 (1950, acq.).
sDu Bane, 10 T. C. 992 (1948). However, where the evidence appears to
be insolubly conflicting or unclear the courts seem to indicate a preference
that payments, all else being equal, will be presumed to be for support,
Landa v. Commissioner, 54-1 USTC 9169 (C. A., D. C., 1954) ; Nathan, 19
T. C. 865 (1953).
In Glasgow, 21 T. C ... , No. 25 (1953), fees of the wife's attorneys in-
cluded in "periodic" payments were held not deductible by the husband, nor,
at least as held in that case, were payments for medical expenses either
already incurred, or anticipated, by the wife.
11 Lehman, 17 T. C. 652 (1951, non-acq.).
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because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed
upon or incurred by" the husband.
If an agreement to support his wife is entered into after
the divorce has been obtained, any legal obligation which
the husband incurs thereunder is not incurred because of
the marital or family relationship. The divorce terminated
the obligation to support, except for whatever provisions
there were in the decree. Payments under an agreement
entered into thereafter are not deductible.,
On the other hand support payments under an agree-
ment entered into directly in connection with the obten-
tion of a divorce will qualify for the alimony tax provisions
even though the decree is granted in a jurisdiction where
the court itself would have no authority, upon the granting
of a decree of absolute divorce, to allow to the wife any
support payments or alimony arrangement whatsoever.8 6
The reason is that before the decree, and at the time of the
agreement, the legal obligation to support did exist.8 7
Likewise, the agreement under which the payments are
made may be void and unenforceable, as against public
policy, but if the duty to support existed at the time it was
entered into, and the payments are made in accordance
therewith, they are deductible.88
Agreement Incident to Decree. The statute says that
where payments are made under a written instrument,
such instrument must be "incident" to the divorce or sepa-
ration. Just what that means and how it is to be proved
has been the subject of considerable litigation. Starting
off with a severely strict construction, the attitude of the
courts has loosened a great deal in their application of
this requirement.
Unchanged has been an insistence that the agreement
must be incident to the "decree", and not to the "status", of
divorce or separation. 9 Although there have been some
rumblings of dissatisfaction with this interpretation of the
Cox v. Commissioner, 176 F. 2d 226 (3rd Cir., 1949).
uHesse, 7 T. C. 700 (1946) ; Hogg, 13 T. C. 361 (1949).
As for obligation to support children, see text, infra, ns. 112 to 115,
ps. 35-36.
Campbell, 15 T. C. 355 (1950, acq.).
Dauwalter, 9 T. C. 580 (1947) ; Cox v. Commissioner, supra, n. 85.
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statutory language,90 wherever of significance to the de-
cision the courts have unanimously insisted that the agree-
ment and the divorce must constitute "a single package".
Likewise, some cases had required proof that both par-
ties contemplated at least the imminent filing of divorce
proceedings, if they were not already filed, at the time of
executing the agreement. 91 But this super-strict attitude
has been substantially ameliorated. The courts now give
the factual situation a careful and realistic review, relying
on obvious inferences from the chronology of the events,
while giving little weight to statements of the parties as to
their intent at the time of the agreement. 92 The fact that
the agreement says it is to be incorporated into, or survive,
any divorce if ever granted is held to be significant.93
Undoubtedly one reason for the drift toward relaxation
of the original "incident" requirements has been the fear
of the charge of collusion. 4 The surest way of meeting the
"incident" test would be to make the effectiveness of the
agreement contingent upon the granting of a divorce; but
in some jurisdictions such a contingency might thereupon
avoid the agreement itself forthwith on the grounds of
public policy.95
In any event the gradual development in the cases shows
that the courts have been willing to break away; and now
10 Smith v. Commissioner, 192 F. 2d 841 (1st Cir., 1951) ; Commissioner v.
Murray, 174 F. 2d 816 (2nd Cir., 1949).
O1Miller, 16 T. C. 1010 (1951), since reversed; and Moses, 18 T. C. 1020
(1952). However, it made no difference if the divorce was expected to be
sought in one jurisdiction and was actually granted in another, as long as
both parties contemplated some divorce, Fry, 13 T. C. 658 (1949) ; or that
the final decision to seek a decree forthwith was made after the agreement
was executed, Guggenheim, 16 T. C. 1561 (1951).
"Commissioner v. Miller, 199 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir., 1952) ; Izrastzoff v.
Commissioner, 193 F. 2d 625 (2nd Cir., 1952). But, if the affirmative evi-
dence all points to the conclusion that neither party contemplated divorce
at the time of the agreement, although it was actually sought promptly after
the termination of the required waiting period (two years), the agreement
is not "incident", Johnson, 21 T. C ... , No. 42 (1953). Likewise, where
payments are made pursuant to one court proceeding in which no divorce
decree has been handed down, even though there is a divorce decree in
another jurisdiction, the payments are not "incident", Droke, 12 T. C. M.
702 (1953).
13 Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F. 2d 260 (3rd Cir., 1952) ; Lerner v.
Commissioner, 195 F. 2d 296 (2nd Cir., 1952).
"Zilmer, 16 T. C. 365 (1951, acq.) ; Johnson, 10 T. C. 647 (1948, acq.)
Lerner v. Commissioner, ibid.
9 'Cronin v. Hebditch, 195 Md. 607, 74 Atl. 2d 50 (1950) ; see also, Shank-
land v. Shankland, 301 Ill. 524, 134 N. E. 67 (1922).
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it is the trend, if not a fact, that an agreement entered into
prior to divorce will be assumed to be "incident" thereto
unless the evidence is to the contrary. Yet the safer and
surer way of avoiding trouble on this point is to introduce
the agreement in evidence in the divorce proceedings and
have the court either set forth the alimony provisions in
full in the decree, or at least have the decree incorporate
the arrangement by reference and affirmance as a part of
the court's order.
Because of this "incident" requirement, long separated
parties may have a problem. In one case, an agreement had
been entered into years before, with no thought given by
either party at the time to a divorce. The agreement was
amended in certain respects and then approved by the
divorce court. As the amendment was made in anticipation
of the divorce, the court held the entire arrangement to
be "incident".98
Payments in Cash or Property; Savings. The payments
will apparently meet the statutory requirements whether
made in cash or in property. If in property, additional
questions of capital gain or loss will obviously be involved.
However, the fair rental value of a home and furnishings
will not qualify. 7 If the husband is to provide a home for
the wife and he wishes to take a deduction therefor he must
either supply the wife with the cash to pay the rent or pay
it to a third party himself.
How the wife is to use the funds paid to her is of no
significance. Even though the agreement provides that she
is to set aside all amounts over a certain figure, to be used
only in emergencies or the like, nevertheless, as long as the
funds are to be used for her a deduction is allowed the
husband.9 8
Lump Sum - Instalment, Periodic Payment. In order
to qualify for alimony tax treatment the payments of the
1Neeman, 13 T. C. 397, aff'd 200 F. 2d 560 (2nd Cir., 1952), cert. den.;
see, also, Holahan, 21 T. C ... , No. 57 (1954). But, as indicated, supra, in
n. 71, if the Congress amends the law to delete the requirement of a divorce
decree the discussion and decisions dealing with the problems of whether
an agreement is incident to a divorce decree obviously become obsolete.
Pappenbeimer v. Allen, 164 F. 2d 428 (5th Cir., 1947).
" McBerty, 16 T. C. 968 (1951, acq.).
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husband must be "periodic". If they are periodic they then
constitute taxable income to the wife and are deductible
by the husband. If not, the wife is not taxable thereon and
the husband gets no deduction. The statute explains that
payments can be defined as "periodic" if they meet either
one of two tests.
If there is no obligation under the agreement or decree
to pay a specific aggregate total amount which is defined
in terms of money or property, that is, a particular lump
sum, then all payments made under the agreement or decree
are "periodic". And they are considered periodic even
though the different payments vary in amount,9 9 or are
made at irregular intervals, or the obligation to make them
at all is dependent upon some condition precedent. 110
Even where there is an obligation to pay a specified
principal sum, if it is also to be satisfied by instalment pay-
ments which may be or are to be made over a period ending
more than ten years from the date of the decree or instru-
ment, the payments are "periodic". But if the fixed sum is
to be paid in one payment or in a series of instalments con-
tinuing for ten years or less, the payments are not "periodic"
and the alimony tax provisions are not applicable.
In other words, assuming that the husband is to pay the
wife $12,000, either by agreement or decree, then whether
this amount is taxable to the wife and deductible by the
husband depends entirely upon how the payment thereof is
to be made. If the $12,000 is to be handed over in a single
lump sum, or even if it is to be paid in instalments of $100
a month for ten years -from the date of the agreement, the
payments will not qualify for any tax deduction for the
husband whatsoever.
On the other hand, if the last payment on account of
the $12,000 is to be made at least one day beyond the tenth
anniversary of the agreement or decree, then a tax deduc-
tion is available. In fact, if the obligation to pay arises out
of an agreement executed prior to the decree, then regard-
less of when the payments are to begin they will be de-
ductible after the passage of the decree, even though they
21 Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F. 2d 369 (2nd Cir., 1953).
'm Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl., 1950), cert. den.
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expire less than ten years after the date of the decree,
provided that the last payment is not due prior to the expir-
ation of ten years and one day after the date of the agree-
ment itself.1"' The only limitation on deductibility in such
a case is that when a fixed sum is being discharged through
instalment payments for a period of over ten years, the
deduction allowed the husband for income tax purposes is
limited in each year to 10% of the fixed sum."0 2
Where accumulations of back obligations are paid in one
lump sum they are nevertheless treated as a single periodic
payment if they represent payments which, if made when
due, or when they might have been due, would have been
so treated.'03 Yet, when a decree providing periodic pay-
ments is amended to substitute a single payment therefor,
the latter is not treated the same way but is considered a
principal sum.'
It seems to be clear that if payments are to be made
until the wife dies or remarries the payments qualify as
periodic. If payments of a fixed amount are to be made
monthly or over other intervals, but to continue for a
period less than at least ten years and one day, the pay-
ments do not qualify as "periodic".0 5 In the latter situa-
tion they are in essence merely instalments of a principal
sum which can easily be determined by simply adding to-
gether all the individual payments; and they will be held
to constitute a principal sum even though the divorce court
decrees that the payments are periodic and that the wife
shall pay the tax thereon. 08
If payments are to continue for a period shorter than
ten years, but are indefinite in amount, such as a percentage
of the husband's annual income, which is not fixed, or on
some other escalation basis, they will qualify as periodic.'0 7
1'0 Blum v. Commissioner, 177 F. 2d 670 (7th Cir., 1949); Commissioner
v. Blum, 187 F. 2d 177 (7th Cir., 1951). See, also, Reis v. U. S., 54-1 USTC
9206 (D. C. Kan., 1953).
102An example of how this statutory provision is applied is Le Mond, 13
T. C. 670 (1949, acq.).
10 See discussion in text, infra, ns. 125 to 127, p. 39.104 Loverin, 10 T. C. 406 (1948) ; but cf. Holahan, supra, n. 96. See, also,
Williams, 12 T. C. M, ... (1953), where the Court seems to have missed
completely the real point.
105 Carmichael, 14 T. C. 1356 (1950, acq.).
"I Casey, 12 T. C. 224 (1949).
10 Young, 10 T. C. 724 (1948, acq.) ; Lee, 10 T. C. 834 (1948, acq.).
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The earlier cases had held that if fixed payments were
to continue for a period of less than ten years "or until the
wife remarries", the latter contingency did not introduce
a sufficient uncertainty as to the ultimate aggregate amount
to remove the payments from the classification of instal-
ments on a fixed sum.' However, a recent case has held
just the reverse, and may well represent a change of posi-
tion by the courts on this point.'0 9
It is interesting to watch the varied arguments of coun-
sel in their well presented efforts to have different types
of payments under separation agreements declared to be
periodic. Where the agreement provides clearly for periodic
payments such as monthly support in one part, and then a
substantial single payment as "additional alimony" or for
some specific purpose in another part, the courts have no
difficulty labeling the special amounts as a principal sum."0
On the other hand the Tax Court has strongly intimated
in two cases that if a little care is exercised in the drafts-
manship, it is possible that a good many extra sums for
specific purposes could be included in an agreement and
still receive the court's approval as periodic payments."'
In other words, periodic payments do not have to be
even in amount. In fact they can vary considerably, so long
as they appear to be component parts of a single unified
plan of payment. When the payments are divided, how-
ever, into several systems or methods, in widely separated
108 Steinel, 10 T. C. 409 (1948) ; Orsatti, 12 T. C. 188 (1949).
109 Baker v. Commissioner, supra, n. 99. It is possible that the Ninth
Circuit may follow this lead in the appeal of Davidson, 11 T. C. M. 1111
(1952). However, the Tax Court itself has decided Fidler, 20 T. C ... ,
No. 149 (1953), since the Second Circuit's decision in Baker, and although
in the later case the contingency is the continued earnings of the husband
at a specified level, the principle is similar and the Tax Court has cate-
gorically refused to follow the rationale of Baker.
Perhaps the ultimate in confusion is Smith's Estate v. Commissioner,
208 F. 2d 349 (3rd Cir., 1953), in which the majority of the court, on the
authority of Baker, held deductible by the husband payments of $300 per
month for five years, provided that in any event they would cease upon
the death of the husband or the wife's death or remarriage. But payments
of $25,000 in ten equal semi-annual instalments were not deductible although
terminable on precisely the same contingencies. The minority opinion
questions Baker but concurs in result on the ground that the $300 payments
were part of a much longer "periodic" pattern.
110 Norton v. Commissioner, 192 F. 2d 960 (8th Cir., 1951) ; Baer v. Com-
missioner, 196 F. 2d 646 (8th Cir., 1952) ; Haag, 17 T. C. 55 (1951).
m Bartsch, 18 T. C. 65, aff'd 203 F. 2d 715 (2nd Cir., 1953) ; Cattier, 17
T. C. 1461 (1952).
MARITAL TAX CONSIDERATIONS
paragraphs of the agreement, the court feels required to
treat them the same way, that is, as separate principal
amounts, and let each stand or fall on its own merits.
Support of Children. If the decree or agreement pro-
vides that payments are to be made for the support of both
the wife and children, without in any way segregating or
indicating what part thereof is for the support of the chil-
dren, the entire amount is deductible by the husband and
taxable to the wife,"' even though she does not wish any
part of the payments for herself, and spends them exclu-
sively on the children."'
On the other hand if the amounts to be paid exclusively
for the children are indicated, either directly or indirectly," 4
then to that extent the payments are not taxable to the
wife or deductible by the husband. The statute itself pro-
vides that if the husband pays less than the full amount of
the periodic payments required under the agreement or
decree, whatever payments that are made are to be applied
first to the sums specified for the support of the children,
and to this extent the husband will get a smaller deduction.
Although under this arrangement the husband would in
most cases be entitled to exemptions for the children as
dependents, nevertheless, normally it is more beneficial for
the husband to ignore those exemptions in order to get a
deduction for the full amount of his alimony payments. But
in this connection it must be remembered that as alimony is
an itemized deduction the husband cannot claim it on his
income tax return if he wishes to take the standard deduc-
tion, viz., 10% of adjusted gross income up to $1,000.
In any event the controlling factor is the particular pro-
vision as contained in the decree or written agreement.
Thus, where a decree requires a husband to pay to his wife
$100 a month for her support and $50 a month for the sup-
'1' Johnson, 10 T. C. 647 (1948, acq.).
2u Moitoret, 7 T. C. 640 (1946). However, the parties were allowed to
amend an alimony decree, even dating its effectiveness back, where the court
was satisfied that the parties had never intended that any alimony was to
be paid for support of the wife but all payments were to be exclusively for
the benefit of the child. Sklar, 21 T. C ... , No. 39 (1953).
1, Fleming, 14 T. C. 1308 (1950) ; Leslie, 10 T. C. 807 (1948) ; Budd v.
Commissioner, 177 F. 2d 198 (6th Cir., 1947) ; Mandel v. Commissioner,
185 F. 2d 50 (7th Cir., 1950).
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port of their son and subsequently he sends the boy to a
boarding school where he pays all the bills and so reduces
the payments to his wife by $50 a month, unless a court
order amending the original decree is obtained, his allow-
able alimony deduction will be reduced by $50 a month."5
Since the wife was no longer supporting the son there was
no reason to continue the payments for him, for which the
husband incidentally got no alimony deduction anyway.
But until the decree is amended the statute requires that
payments be applied first to the provisions allowing for
the support of children as required by the decree, regard-
less of how the parties may have otherwise agreed between
themselves.
Life Insurance Premiums."6 Where, under the separa-
tion agreement or decree, the husband is to keep life insur-
ance in force for the wife, the premiums thereafter paid
may be taxable income to the wife and deductible by the
husband, even though paid by the husband direct to the
company. The determining consideration appears to be
whether the insurance is carried merely to secure the per-
formance of the husband's obligations after his death, or
whether the insurance is unconditionally assigned to the
wife in such a way that she receives a tangible economic
benefit or gain capable of measurement or of reasonably
precise valuation at the time of each premium payment.
Thus, where the policies are to be kept in force merely
to provide the wife with continuing payments, after the
husband's death, either in the form of more instalments or
even as a single sum to discharge all further obligations,
but she must survive her husband in order to capitalize in
any way on the value of the policies, no deduction is allowed
to the husband for premiums paid." 7
On the other hand, where policies are absolutely as-
signed to the wife, or where she is made an irrevocable
1Blyth, 21 T. C ... , No. 31 (1953). And, likewise, see Sklar, supra,
n. 113, and cf. Williams, 12 T. C. M. ... (1953).
n8 For discussion of estate -tax and surviving wife's income tax problems
relating to life insurance see text, infra, ns. 166 to 175, ps. 53-56.
n Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 183 F. 2d 15 (3rd Cir., 1950) ; Carmichael,
14 T. C. 1356 (1950, acq.) ; Gardner, 14 T. C. 1445, aff'd 191 F. 2d 857 (6tb
Cir., 1951) ; Taylor, 16 T. C. 376 (1951) ; see also Baker, 17 T. C. 1610, aff'd
205 F. 2d 369 (2nd Cir., 1953).
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beneficiary and is likewise made the substantial owner of
the policies so that she can exercise rights of ownership
for her own benefit at any time, such as receiving the cash
surrender value, or where she has control over whether
the particular funds are to be paid to her or used to
satisfy insurance premiums, it has been held that the
premiums paid under such circumstances are deductible
by the husband."18
Perhaps the real test, which would not lead to conclu-
sions inconsistent with the above but which might make
the answers more easily recognizable, should be and is
whether the wife either actually or constructively has re-
ceived anything of immediately liquidatable cash value at
the time a premium is paid. That is, since the wife must be
subject to income tax upon the amount of any alimony pay-
ment in order for the husband to receive a deduction, under
this rule the husband would get no tax benefit unless the
wife receives something, in the year in which she is to
be taxed, which has a readily ascertainable value at that
time."' Therefore, until clarified, the tax planner must
keep in mind that perhaps premiums on term insurance
could never be deducted by the husband, since it has no
current cash value - unless it is purchased and carried by
the wife with monies paid by the husband to her rather
than to the insurance company.
m I. T. 4001, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 27; Carmichael, ibid; Stewart, 9 T. C. 195
(1947, acq.) ; Estate of Hart, 11 T. C. 16 (1948, acq.).
ng Sellgmann v. Commissioner, 207 F. 2d 489 (7th Cir., 1953). In this
case the court noted that the earlier decisions had all dealt with whether
or not a husband should be entitled to a deduction, not whether the wife
should bear the tax. Actually, the husband of the petitioner in this very
case had previously won a deduction [not appealed] in the Tax Court,
Mandel, 8 T. C. M. 445 (1949). In Seligmann the court held that the wife
could not be taxed on premiums paid for insurance held by a trustee to pay
Income to her after the husband's death since, at the time of premium pay-
ment, "it was a matter of rank speculation as to whether the Petitioner
would ever realize any economic gain". To the same effect is Smith, 21
T. C ... , No. 40 (1953).
As indicated in the text following the reference to this footnote, a case
decided after Seligmann and involving another Smith, seems to suggest an
even more stringent rule to the effect that the mere fact that a wife must
survive her husband in order for the insurance money to be payable to her
Is "enough to preclude deduction [by the husband] of payments no matter
when made". Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F. 2d 349 (3rd Cir.,
1953).
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It has even been suggested that, in addition, the mere
appointment of a contingent beneficiary, or the retention
of a reversionary interest in the husband in the event the
wife does not survive him, would prevent the allowance of
a deduction to the husband.
Attorneys' Fees. Finally, in so far as the original sepa-
ration negotiations are concerned, there is the question of
whether the payment by the husband of attorneys' fees, his
own or his wife's, will be deductible by him either as an
alimony payment or as a non-business expense. In almost
all cases the answer is in the negative.2 '
However, where the attorneys devote time exclusively
to a negotiation to preserve, from a valid but wholly de-
structive claim of the wife, the property upon which the
husband's entire financial independence is based, the fee
therefor is a proper non-business expense.' 2 ' But the danger
to the husband's income-producing capacity must be im-
minent and of serious magnitude. To warrant a deduction
the services must be rendered in vital financial negotiation,
not merely in defending against an ordinary claim of sup-
port or default.'22
By the same token, where the attorneys for the wife
have devoted time solely in negotiating for her special
financial advantage, in the way of greater income either
prior or subsequent to the decree, she may deduct these
charges. 123 But, even where the fees are exclusively for
negotiations relating to an increase in alimony payments,
no deduction is allowed if the amount received by the wife
is not taxable to her. If the payments she receives are par-
tially lump sum and partially periodic, a deduction is
allowed in proportion to the taxable amount. 24
-0 I. T. 3856, 1947-1 Cum. Bull. 23; Howard v. Commissioner, 202 F. 2d 28
(9th Cir., 1953); Glasgow, 21 T. C ... , No. 25 (1953).
Baer v. Commissioner. 196 F. 2d 646 (8th Cir., 1952).
11 Donnelley, 16 T. C. 1196 (1951) ; Smith Estate v. Commissioner, supra,
n. 119.
12 Gale, 13 T. C. 661 (1949) ; Relghley, 17 T. C. 344 (1951) ; except, of
course, ;that she gets no deduction where she is a non-resident alien and her
aggregate income, including alimony payments, from sources within the
United States is less than $15,400, Dupre v. United States, 53-2 USTC 9613
(S. D., N. Y., 1953).
u4 Le Mond, 13 T. C. 670 (1949, acq.). After this decision the Commis-
sioner amended his Regulations, T. D. 5889, 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 31.
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In cases where the wife is allowed at least some deduc-
tion it might be well, in order for someone to get an income
tax advantage therefrom, to work out in the settlement a
payment to the wife so that she, rather than the husband,
would pay her attorneys.
Accumulating Deductions. Although the parties may be
on an accrual basis, as far as alimony payments are con-
cerned they are treated as being on a cash basis except for
prepayments of instalments on a fixed sum.
The ability to accumulate and throw several years' pay-
ments into one taxable year obviously gives the husband
what at times might amount to a very substantial tax-
saving opportunity. By the same token it places the wife,
quite unfairly in many cases, in a position of great dis-
advantage over which she has no control. If the husband
wishes a large deduction in a later year, and if he makes no
payments until then, he gets the increased deduction, and
the wife must pay the tax at the higher rates on the entire
accumulation in that one year.'25 The same conclusion has
been reached where the aggregate payments are collected
by the deceased wife's executor in a lump sum.128
Where the separation agreement provides that an in-
crease in payments can be requested if the husband's in-
come exceeds a certain figure, and the court awards addi-
tional payments for the previous years nunc pro tunc in a
lump sum, it has been held that the wife is taxed on the
entire amount in the year of receipt."'
There is one slight variation in this rule and that is
where instalment payments over a period of more than ten
years are involved. In such a case it is still true that if a
husband fails to make payments for several years and then
Reighley, 17 T. C. 344 (1951) ; Welsh Trust, 16 T. C. 1398, aff'd 194 F.
2d 708 (3rd Cir., 1952), cert. den.; Grant v. Commissioner, 209 F. 2d 430(2nd Cir., 1953). And see Dupre v. United States, supra, n. 123, which also
holds that periodic alimony payments do not qualify either as a life annuity
or as a pension under the tax treaty between France and the United States.
It has even been held by the Tax Court in a recent case that where there
is a compromise settlement of arrearages on alimony payments, which
arrearages had accrued even prior -to the passage In 1942 of the statute
which first made such payments taxable to the wife, she is still taxable on
receipt of the ancient accruals in a lump sum after 1942, Holahan, 21
T. C ... , No. 57 (1954).Estate of Narischkine, 14 T. C. 1128, aff'd 189 F. 2d 257 (2nd Cir., 1951).
Gale v. Commissioner, 191 F. 2d 79 (2nd Cir., 1951).
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makes them all at once, the single payment will not be
treated as a non-deductible lump sum, but rather as a de-
ductible periodic payment. However, since no more than
10% of instalment payments on a principal sum are de-
ductible in any one year under any circumstances, any
payments in excess of that figure are not taxable to the
wife nor deductible by the husband. By the terms of the
statute itself no part of a prepaid instalment on a lump sum
is deductible regardless of over how long a period the pay-
ments are to be made.
Amendment of Agreement After Decree. One of the
most unsettled problems relating to alimony deductions for
income taxes is the proper application of the requirement
that payments must be pursuant to an agreement or decree
"incident" to the divorce, where the terms of the agreement
are changed after the decree.
If the original agreement and decree provide that the
stipulated payments for support can be modified by the
parties in the future, with the court to do so if the parties
cannot agree, it is clear. The subsequent agreement is "inci-
dent" to the prior decree even though the later arrangement
is not submitted to the court for approval." 8 Likewise,
where the subsequent agreement is merely a clarification or
construction of a prior decree, or of a prior agreement which
was incident to a divorce granted perhaps many years be-
fore, the amending agreement is "incident". In such a case
neither the original nor the amendment would have to be
approved or adopted by any court.12 9
But where the parties change the terms of their origi-
nal agreement without the compulsion of either of the
foregoing situations, the cases are not completely clear,'31
although it can probably be categorically stated that in the
ms Smith v. Commissioner, 192 F. 2d 841 (1st Cir., 1951) ; Gale v. Commis-
sioner, supra, n. 127.
m Barnum, 19 T. C. 401 (1953) ; Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285
(Ct. Cl., 1950), cert. den.; Holahan, 8upra, n. 125.
'1 Perhaps the most confusing situation grows out of the fact that pre-
cisely the same agreement and circumstances have been presented to the
courts in two different jurisdictions - in one case by the husband and in
the other by the wife. The Commissioner thus far has lost both ways.
Commissioner v. Walsh, 183 F. 2d 803 (C. A., D. C., 1950) ; Walsh v. West-
over, 53-1 USTC 9283 (D. C., Cal., 1953).
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simple case where the husband increases his payments
voluntarily, no deduction will be allowed,131 and where the
new agreement reduces payments, with the original decree
still in force, the revised payments are deductible.'32 And,
likewise, even if the court has retained jurisdiction to
modify the terms of the alimony, or if the decree is signifi-
cantly amended with the consent of the parties, a court can-
not project the effectiveness of its new order nunc pro tunc
in such a way as to permit increased payments to be deduc-
tible for any period prior to the actual date of the entry of
the new order;133 and without at least a subsequent decree
at some time, no part of the revised increases can ever
be deducted.'
Undoubtedly the safest procedure is always to have any
variation or amendment to the original agreement approved
and adopted by the same court which originally granted the
decree. Whether or not the court had retained jurisdiction
over the granting of alimony, so that the necessary marital
obligation is still there, is a matter of local law in each
jurisdiction; and this is true whether or not alimony was
awarded in the original decree.
Providing for Alimony Through a Trust. In many in-
stances the husband makes the payments of alimony to his
wife out of his own pocket and it is of no consequence
whether he uses income or principal therefor. The wife is
taxable on everything she receives, as ordinary income, and
Dauwalter, 9 T. C. 580 (1947). Nor did the court here retain jurisdic-
tion over alimony.
Commissioner v. Murray, 174 F. 2d 816 (2nd Cir., 1949). However, as
indicated, supra, in note 71, if the Congress amends the law to delete the
requirement of a divorce decree the problems herein discussed with regard
to amending the agreement would probably cease to exist.
Van Vlaanderen v. Commissioner, 175 F. 2d 389 (3rd Cir., 1949) ; unless
the controlling language in the original order was inserted by mistake, and
can therefore be merely corrected through a nune pro tune order, Sklar, 21
T. C ... , No. 39 (1953).
' Newton v. Pedrick, 115 F. Supp. 368 (D. C., N. Y., 1953). Notice should
be taken here of Smith v. Commissioner, 192 F. 2d 841 (1st Cir., 1951),
which held -that amended payments are taxable to the wife even where the
subsequent agreement expressly cancelled and terminated the original agree-
ment. The court so held because "the genesis of the 1937 and the 1944
agreements was the same - a satisfaction by the husband of his marital
obligation". This is not in line with other Circuits, but the decision could
probably be supported on other grounds.
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the husband gets a deduction on everything he pays. How-
ever, the husband can arrange to be relieved of this con-
tinuing responsibility by providing for the payments to be
made from a trust, or even through the purchase of an
annuity, if desired.
As far as trusts are concerned, there are two entirely
separate and distinct types recognized under the alimony
taxing provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.' One of
these Code sections is designed to cover the usual situa-
tion where a husband provides for his alimony payments
through the use of a trust which he creates expressly for
that purpose. The section relating to the other type of trust
is merely to pick up the few instances, and give to the hus-
band the full income tax benefit of alimony payments to
the wife, where trusts are used for that purpose but they
are not the usual type of trust otherwise covered.
To be specific, what is known as a Section 22(k) trust is
one that is normally set up under the provisions of a sepa-
ration agreement or divorce decree. The sole purpose for
its creation and existence is to satisfy the support obliga-
tions of the husband. In the words of the statute it is a
trust that is set up by the husband to discharge a legal
obligation which is imposed upon or incurred by him under
a divorce decree or separation agreement.
On the other hand there are times when a trust which
is already in existence, and on the income of which the
husband is now taxable, can be used for this purpose. It
may have been created at some prior time by the husband,
or it may have been created by someone else. Thus, the
husband's grandmother may have set up a trust to pay the
income to him for life, but the provisions may be such that
he can assign his interest therein to take care of his obliga-
tions to his wife. Other examples of what are known as
Section 171 trusts are where the husband has himself
created a trust prior to marriage, or earlier in his married
life, under which the income is payable to his wife expressly
for her support, and therefore the income thereon is taxable
to him since it is discharging his legal obligation; or where
185I. R. C., Secs. 22(k) and 171(a).
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the husband has set up a trust but reserved the right to
change the beneficiaries.
In all of these cases the income either already is, or can
be made, payable to the wife to satisfy the husband's sup-
port obligations. At the same time the separation or the
negotiations between the parties leading up to a divorce
actually had nothing whatsoever to do with the creation of
the trust. The provisions of Section 22 (k) would not apply.
The additional statutory relief was therefore necessary in
order to exempt the husband from a continuing tax liability
on income where the particular trust is thereafter used to
satisfy his alimony obligations.
The chief practical difference between the two types of
trusts is the tax treatment of any corpus or principal, as
distinguished from income, paid to the wife in partial satis-
faction of the husband's support obligations. In one case the
wife is taxable thereon, and there is no one who can take
the compensating income tax deduction; whereas in the
other case the wife is only taxable at most on her propor-
tionate share of the taxable income of the trust, regardless
of how much of the corpus she may receive.
In other words, in a Section 22 (k) situation the wife is
taxable on all amounts paid to her whether the payments
are from income or principal.30 At the same time the trust
will only get a deduction to the extent of the income that is
paid out. The benefit of any deduction on account of prin-
cipal that is paid by the trust is completely lost.
Under a Section 171 trust, on the contrary, the wife pays
a tax only on the income she receives.137 In fact, she only
pays a tax upon her share of the taxable income of the trust.
Thus, if any part of the amount paid to her is taken from
principal she is not taxable thereon. Likewise, if the trust
from which she receives her payments has tax free income,
such as from municipal bonds, the wife will be taxed on
her receipt of income only in proportion to the ratio of the
taxable to the non-taxable income of the entire trust.1 38
"' Welsh Trust, 16 T. C. 1398, aff'd 194 F. 2d 708 (3rd Cir., 1952), cert. den.
Likewise, they are taxable to a non-resident alien even where also taxable
by a foreign country, Rev. Rul., 54-53, I. R. B. 1954-6.
181Regs. 118, Sec. 39.171-1 (a) (2).
I' Stewart, 9 T. C. 195 (1947, acq.).
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Since the Section 171 situation only comes up, as a prac-
tical matter, where there is an already existing trust which
can be made use of, it is relatively infrequent. However,
where available it should probably be employed. The only
requirements are a divorce and a trust of which the income
is taxable to the husband.1 9 Nothing could be simpler. But
it must also be remembered that, except with one very
minor exception, a trust cannot qualify for Section 171
treatment if it likewise comes within the provisions of Sec-
tion 22(k), which it usually does.140
Payment of Alimony Through an Annuity. Providing
for the discharge of alimony through the use of an annuity
payable to the wife would be one of the most undesirable
ways it could be done. The purchase of the annuity by the
husband would be a lump sum or specified amount. The
cost would not be deductible by him.
Although there is a special rule for the payment of in-
come tax on only that part of annuity receipts during the
taxable year which equal 3% of the cost of the annuity,
there is a special exception as to payments which are sub-
ject to the alimony taxing provisions of the Code. All pay-
ments to the wife under such an annuity would be taxed to
her in full,"' without any deduction available to the hus-
band. '4 Thus, all the disadvantages would accrue, with
none of the advantages.
If for special reasons in a particular case it is decided
that an annuity is the best solution, it should be paid, if
feasible, to the husband who could then make the payments
to the wife. In this way the wife would still be taxed on
the whole amount, but the husband would have the advan-
tage of the 3% rule plus a deduction in full for the pay-
ments to his wife.
"I Mahana v. United States, supra, n. 129.
l-"Section 171(a) does not apply in any case to which Section 22(k)
applies", Regs. 118, Sec. 39.171-1(a) (2) ; Welsh Trust, 8upra, n. 136; except
that when support of the wife is provided in a trust created by ante-nuptial
agreement, the payments to the wife after divorce will be subject to the
provisions of Sec. 171 unless the decree, as originally passed or amended,
refers to the agreement; see Regs. 118, Sec. 39.22(k)-1(a) (4) ex. (3).
1,11. R. C., Sec. 22(b) (2) (A).
"'2Regs. 118, See. 39.22(k)-1(b) (1).
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Marital Settlements Involving
Property Rights
The problems relating to alimony agreements exclu-
sively for support, which must be thoroughly known and
understood by any participating tax planner, have been dis-
cussed in some detail because this type of agreement is the
most commonly used tool in cases dealing with divorce or
legal separation. The normal concept of alimony payments
is that they are for the support and maintenance to which
the wife is entitled under the marriage contract.
In addition, however, the wife usually has some right in
her husband's property. Depending upon the particular
jurisdiction this might be common law dower, or a statu-
tory share, or some other similar form of claim. When
negotiating for a permanent separation agreement between
the parties it is customary to provide for mutual releases
of these respective rights in each other's property and
estate. Unfortunately, the tax problems involved in such
arrangements are much less definitely settled.
Gift Taxes. Where a transfer is made by one spouse in
consideration of the release by the other spouse of her
future or inchoate marital rights in her husband's property,
there is not a sufficiently adequate and full consideration to
avoid the application of the gift tax. Except to the extent
that the consideration represents a release of support rights,
a gift tax is payable on the full value of the property so
transferred.14
There is one exception. If the transfer in consideration
of a release of property rights is made under the mandate,
and in accordance with a specific decree, of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, the transfer does not constitute a gift
for gift tax purposes. 4'
11 E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166.
I" Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U. S. 106 (1950). Although that sounds
simple enough, just what it means as a proposition of law is hard to tell.
It was the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of the United States, but
the other courts, as well as annotators and law review contributors, ever
since have failed to agree on just how far that principle extends, or just
what was really meant by the majority of the court in its meanderings
through unrelated statements of inconsistent suggestions of controlling
principles.
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Gift Taxes - Transfers Under a Decree of Court. It has
been stated by many text writers that the law on gifts to
spouses for release of property rights is now clear. If the
arrangement is affirmatively approved by the divorce court,
and incorporated in its decree, there is no gift tax problem.
There is considerable doubt about that proposition in the
mind of this writer.
It is unfortunate that the leading cases on the subject
all involved Nevada decrees of divorce, obtained at a time
when the law of that State provided that in a divorce pro-
ceeding "the court may award such alimony to the wife and
shall make such disposition of the community and separate
property of the parties as shall appear just and equitable,
having regard to the respective merits of the parties and
the condition in which they will be left by such divorce".115
The significant language in that statutory provision has
since been deleted,146 and few other states have a statute
giving to their courts the kind of authority upon which the
leading cases have so heavily relied.11
From a careful analysis of the decisions cited and ap-
proved by the majority opinion in the one case decided on
this subject by the Supreme Court, and from a reading of
subsequent decisions which have tried to rationalize some
of the statements in that opinion, or interpret what must
have been meant, it is believed by this writer that the only
absolutely safe avenue to follow in reaching for non-taxable
'15Nevada Compiled Laws (Supp. 1931-1941), Sec. 9463.
""The words "and separate" were not included in the amending statute.
Nevada Stats. 1943, 117. It would thus appear that the Nevada court can
no longer determine how the rights of each party in the property of the
other should be divided.
"I In Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d 929 (2nd Cir., 1946), and Estate
of Watson, 20 T. C. 386 (1953), pertaining to the estate tax, and in Com-
missioner v. Converse, 163 F. 2d 131 (2nd Cir., 1947), and Harris v. Com-
missioner, supra, n. 144, dealing with the gift tax, the courts seemed
clearly and explicitly to conclude that this particular provision of the
Nevada law made all the difference; and to the same effect see also the
later cases of McMurtry v. Commissioner, 203 F. 2d 659 (1st Cir., 1953),
and Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F. 2d 505 (2nd Cir., 1953).
But, on the other hand, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue currently
seems to attach no significance whatever to this special provision which
existed in the Nevada law, Rev. Rul. 54-29, I. R. B. 1954-3. His present
conclusion appears to be that if the effectiveness of a separation agreement
depends on the approval of a divorce court, and that approval is given, there
can be no gift. However, in the situation presented in the Ruling, there may
well have been no gift involved anyway since there was probably a release
of support rights.
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transfers in consideration of a release of property rights, is:
(1) the court passing the decree should be located in a juris-
diction where the law provides that in a divorce case the
court "shall determine how the rights of each party in the
property of the other shall be divided", or have some other
similar but absolute authority; (2) the transfer of the
property should be withheld until the passage of such a
decree; and (3) the agreement should provide that its
effectiveness and enforceability are dependent upon the ap-
proval thereof by the divorce court, and that it be incor-
porated in the decree.
That the court must have some power and responsibility
over the property of the parties as indicated in (1) above
is at least a justifiable conclusion from the cases. That the
transfer must await the decree seems clear, for otherwise
it could not be said to be made in pursuance thereof.14 8
The real problem is the apparent requirement that the
agreement must provide that its effectiveness and enforce-
ability are dependent upon the approval of a divorce court.
The difficulty is, as heretofore discussed in connection with
proving that an agreement is "incident" to a decree of
divorce, that such a condition might well have the effect
in some jurisdictions of invalidating the agreement com-
pletely, as being contrary to public policy. However, this
writer does not believe that such a condition must be
satisfied in order to obtain a non-taxable transfer, although
to be "absolutely safe" under the present decisions it should
be satisfied if practicable.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court, standing
by itself, apparently does require the conditioning of the
agreement on the approval of the divorce court. But its
authorities do not support its conclusion. The Court cited
with approval a case in which the effect of the agreement
was not made dependent upon the subsequent entry of a
decree.149
Since the Supreme Court decision, but with it consci-
ously in mind, a Circuit Court of Appeals has held that there
Commissioner v. Barnard's Estate, 176 F. 2d 233 (2nd Cir., 1949).
I9 Commissioner v. Maresi, supra, n. 147.
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is no gift tax if the divorce is obtained where the court "had
the jurisdiction to grant or impose property rights and
obligations among the parties". The agreement did not state
that its effectiveness was subject to the approval of a divorce
court. On the contrary the agreement provided that it
"shall remain in full force and effect, and the provisions
may be embodied" in the decree if the court shall deem the
same proper. 5 '
Thus, for draftsmen in states where care must be taken
not to invalidate their own agreements through some viola-
tion of public policy growing out of an alleged collusion to
seek a divorce, it seems at least arguable, if not a strong
possibility, that no reference to dependence upon approval
in a divorce decree is necessary. 5' But, in order that rights
may be fully and permanently settled, it can do no harm, in
fact it might be well, to state that if at any time either party
shall file for divorce, the agreement shall be submitted to
the court for approval, and that it shall survive any decree,
and represent the only binding obligations between the
parties.
In substance this simply means that if the court to which
is submitted such an agreement is authorized by law to
declare rights in the property of the parties, and it approves
and adopts the agreement, there is no gift tax. If it does
not either have the authority or give its approval, the agree-
ment is still enforceable by the parties, but a gift tax will
be due to the extent that the transfer is for a release of
property rights rather than support rights.
Gift Taxes - Transfers for the Benefit of Children. It
has been attempted in several cases to extend to gifts for
the benefit of children the doctrine that transfers approved
and adopted by a decree of divorce are relieved of gift tax
consequences. But the efforts have been unsuccessful.
'0 McMurtry v. Commissioner, supra, n. 147. As a refinement of this
thought a recent case has held that a transfer by a wife to a husband in
consideration of his willingness to execute a final and binding separation
agreement under which he would transfer property to her in exchange for a
release of her marital rights, was not a gift, Grigg, 20 T. C. 420 (1953, acq.).
"' This conclusion was not reached by a District Court in the Circuit
which seems most strongly to indicate this result. Bank of New York v.
U. S., 115 F. Supp. 375 (D. C., N. Y., 1953).
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It seems clear that where a separation agreement pro-
vides for a transfer of property by a husband, either out-
right or in trust, for the support and maintenance of his
children during minority, there is no gift subject to tax.
However, to the extent that such an agreement gives the
children interests in property after they have reached
majority, or makes provision for them over and above their
reasonable needs of support and maintenance until reaching
majority, there is a gift subject to the application of the
gift tax laws.152
Gift Taxes - Timing of Transfer. Where the transfer to
the wife is contingent upon the approval of the court, or
the granting of the decree, it must obviously be made after
the marital status has been terminated. If it should then
be held to be a gift it would have been made too late to
enjoy the tax saving allowance of the marital deduction.
Where the agreement is effective immediately, regard-
less of any future decree, the transfer should probably be
made before the marital bonds are severed in order to be
sure of the benefit of the marital deduction. Although the
recent cases do hold that the moment at which the gift tax
applies is the date of execution of the agreement,'53 not the
date of delivery, nevertheless it seems pointless to run any
risk since this question of just when the gift is complete
for tax purposes does not appear as yet to be finally settled.
'a2 There is no magic in a court decree. In spite of what Harris, supra,
n. 144, seems to say, a transfer of property does not "obtain exemption from
the federal gift tax by simply receiving the court's imprimatur", Rosenthal
v. Commissioner, 8upra, n. 147; Hooker v. Commissioner, 174 F. 2d 863
(5th Cir., 1949).
51In an early ante-nuptial gift tax case, Archbold, 42 B. T. A. 453 (1940),
It was held that a promise to make a transfer, even though enforceable, Is
not a present gift. However, in the Harris case (supra, n. 144), when before
the Court of Appeals, Harris v. Commissioner, 178 F. 2d 861 (2nd Cir., 1949,
rev'd on other grounds), it was held that the wife's promise to pay the hus-
band $5,000 a year for ten years did not constitute a series of gifts, each
taxable when made, but was rather a single gift taxable at full annuity value
at the time the promise became enforceable. Then, in Commissioner v.
Copley's Estate, 194 F. 2d 364 (7th Cir., 1952), in dealing with an ante-
nuptial agreement, the court did not even mention Archbold but followed the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Harris. However, the dissenting opinion
in Copley's Estate is persuasive. To complete the confusion the confused
majority in the Harris case in the Supreme Court did not intentionally deal
with the problem but nevertheless made statements which could easily be
construed to mean that the court agreed with the dissent in Copley's Estate.
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Gift Taxes - Valuation of Gift in Instalments. Like-
wise, the value of a series of transfers, such as annual pay-
ments for a period of years in exchange for the release of
property rights, is held to be determined by appraising the
present actuarial value thereof, and not by multiplying the
amount of each payment by the number of payments to be
made.15 4
It can probably be assumed, however, that if the rule
as to gifts of payments in instalments should be changed to
tax each payment as made, the valuation rule would also
be changed in order to be consistent.
Separate Agreements. In planning the separation there
is one further and important consideration. The usual
agreement contains provision both for support of the wife
and release of property rights. But it is not necessary that
all be incorporated in one paper. Substantial benefit might
be obtained by not doing so.
Thus, as we have seen, a transfer in consideration of a
release of support rights does not involve a gift tax, but
where property rights are involved, it does. And, for this
situation the Treasury has given the planner a tip to con-
sider. It has stated that an allocation of what can fairly be
said to be the true value of relinquished support rights shall
be determined by the Bureau, now Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, "in the absence of a reasonable allocation or segrega-
tion by the parties". 5' Separate agreements could be the
answer.
By taking the initiative and clearly describing one agree-
ment as being made in consideration of the release by the
wife of the valuable support rights to which she would be
entitled during the joint lives of the parties, and which she
is willing to forego in exchange for varying, albeit smaller
payments in the aggregate, for life, or whatever the period
may be, the agreement might include not only periodic pay-
ments extending beyond the remarriage of the wife and
1" Court of Appeals in Harris v. Commissioner, supra, n. 153. This is con-
sistent with the method of valuing claims of the wife against the estate,
continuing after the husband's death. Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d
929 (2nd Cir., 1946) ; Fleming v. Yoke, 53 F. Supp. 552, aff'd 145 F. 2d 472
(4th Cir., 1944).
E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166.
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the death of the husband, but also perhaps some additional
lump sum or instalment payments during the first years.
The other agreement would represent the transfer for
the release of property rights, subject to gift tax, but at the
low figure of consideration the parties reasonably consider
proper.
Income Taxes. If property other than cash is trans-
ferred, a careful eye must be kept on what is being ex-
changed for what. The problem which will be presented
either immediately or later will be that of capital gains, and
the discussion above under the heading "Income taxes" in
considering the problems of "Ante-nuptial agreements" is
equally pertinent and applicable here.
To repeat, the Supreme Court has held that a release
of property rights is not a sufficient consideration to avoid
the application of the gift tax. On the other hand the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has flatly stated that in its opinion
such a consideration is full and adequate for income tax
considerations.
Were it not for this wholly inconsistent but, for the
present at least, authoritative ruling as to the application
of the income tax law, a husband might well wish to make
use of appreciated property in the course of discharging his
obligations under a separation agreement for the release of
property rights. The gift tax would be the same whether
he should use the appreciated property or cash; whereas if
he should liquidate the property first, through a sale, he
would then not have that much money available for the
purpose, because of the erosion of the capital gain tax.
However, to advise any such procedure under the pres-
ent state of the law would certainly seem unwise. Until
there is more clarification if not an actual reversal of the
existing law on the subject, the tax planner must accept at
least the possibility that where the income tax is involved
a transfer of property in consideration of either a release
of support rights or a release of property rights will not be
treated as a gift, with the wife taking the husband's basis,
but rather, if the property has appreciated above the hus-
band's cost, the husband will have a capital gain tax liability
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to the extent of the difference between his adjusted basis
and the market value of the property at the time of trans-
fer.15 6 Likewise, a new basis would thereby be attributed
to the property in the hands of the wife, namely, the market
value as of the date of transfer.15 7
Death of Wife
Any accrued payments under a separation agreement
which are owing to the wife at the time of her death, and
which are collected by her executors, are income in respect
of the decedent and taxable to her estate as such. 5 ' Even
though several back payments are received in a lump sum
they are still considered periodic and taxable as ordinary
income.' 59
Death of Husband
Income Taxes. If periodic payments are to be continued
to the wife, and are to be paid from the husband's estate
after his death, his estate is entitled to take an income tax
deduction therefor to the extent of the estate income. 6 '
But no deduction can be taken by the estate for any .prin-
cipal paid out to help meet such obligations.'6 '
Everything received by the wife from the estate,
whether income or principal, is taxable to her as ordinary
income. 62
Estate Taxes. As in the case of gift taxes, a promise
given in consideration of the release by the wife of her
rights to support is, to the extent of the reasonable value
of the support rights, "to be treated as made for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth".63 Thus,
1 Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F. 2d 986 (3rd Cir., 1941), cert. den.; Com-
missioner v. Halliwell, 131 F. 2d 642 (2nd Cir., 1942), cert. den.
wPatino, 13 T. C. 816, aff'd 186 F. 2d 962 (4th Cir., 1950); Gardner
Trust, 20 T. C ... , No. 125 (1953). See also Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Com-
missioner, 160 F. 2d 812 (2nd Cir., 1947), and the discussion on the similar
problem in considering ante-nuptial agreements, supra, n. 22.
I. R. C., Sec. 126(a) (1) (A).
m Estate of Narischkine, 14 T. C. 1128, aff'd 189 F. 2d 257 (2nd Cir., 1951).
181In Laughlin's Estate v. Commissioner, 167 F. 2d 828 (9th Cir., 1948),
it was decided that the estate could not take the deduction under I. R. C.
See. 23(u) as could the husband, but that the payment would be deductible
under Secs. 162(b) and 171(b).
I- G. C. M. 25999, 1949-1 Cum. Bull. 116.
"e Welsh Trust, 16 T. C. 1398, aff'd 194 F. 2d 708 (3rd Cir., 1952), cert. den.
"'E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166.
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a claim of the wife under a separation agreement would
normally be deductible in full as a claim against the hus-
band's estate.
It is probable that in most cases the agreement under
which the wife has been receiving periodic payments will
not be challenged by the Commissioner. But, where it can
be demonstrated that the payments represent at least in
part a consideration for the release of property rights, then
to that extent the claim will not be recognized as a deduc-
tion for estate taxes even though it is perfectly enforceable
against the estate.
However, the last sentence must be modified as was the
case with gift taxes, to the extent that if the claim is sup-
ported by a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction
which has approved the agreement, then the claim will be
recognized as a proper deduction.'"
When allowed, the claim is valued by determining actu-
arially the present worth of the stipulated future payments
in the light of the life expectancy of the wife and her ex-
pectancy as to remarriage, where significant.'65
Life Insurance - Income to Wife. Where life insurance
policies are purchased as security for the husband's obliga-
tions, to assure the continuance of payments after his death,
the payments when received are taxable income to the
wife.166 Even though the payments may in part be made
from principal, such as through the exercise of one of the
instalment options, the full amount is taxable as ordinary
income."7
If, on the other hand, the policies are not security for
future payments but are absolutely assigned to the wife,
there is the question of whether she is taxable on the pro-
ceeds to the extent that they exceed the consideration paid
by her as the purchase price of the policies through the
1
" Commissioner v. Maresi, supra, n. 154; Fleming v. Yoke, supra, n. 154;
Estate of Watson, 20 T. C. 386 (1953) ; and see discussion, supra, n. 147.
Im Maresi and Fleming, ibid. Actually the Maresi case was decided on the
ground that support rights were not adequate consideration, on which the
court subsequently reversed itself. But it is still authority for the proposi-
tions for which it is cited.
1 I. R. C., Sec. 22(k).
1' Last sentence of I. R. C., Sec. 22(b) (2) (A).
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release of her support rights. 6 Added to that is the fact
that one court has declared that for income tax pur-
poses the release of property rights is a good and valuable
consideration. 69
If so, what is the value of those considerations? Would
the value thereof be the cash surrender value of the policies
at the time of transfer, or the premiums theretofore paid
by the husband which in each case would be greater or less
depending on the age of the contracts? Or would it be zero
if a new policy were to be purchased?
Would it make any difference whether or not the policies
are only for security? Would the wife be taxable anyway,
for periodic payments, on all amounts received under an
instalment option? Or, suppose she received the proceeds
in a lump sum instead. Would that be considered a "prin-
cipal sum", thereby relieving her of tax, or would it be
considered a group of periodic payments, and therefore
taxable as ordinary income? 7 '
In order to try to avoid some of these income tax
problems for the wife, although they would probably be of
little benefit in so far as the estate tax problems of the hus-
band are concerned, there are two possible courses which
might be suggested. The first would be to have the hus-
band retain the policies and make the wife an irrevocable
beneficiary. At the same time he could release all rights to
cash surrender values, to pledge as collateral, and the like.
Whether this solution would accomplish the desired results
is questionable at best. Also, whether done this way or
assigned, there is perhaps a gift tax involved.
A preferable solution would be for the wife to apply for
insurance on the husband's life and pay the initial premium
from her own funds. Thereafter she should pay all prem-
iums herself. Naturally the husband would have to make
larger periodic payments to her than if he were paying
the premiums himself, but it would all add up to the same
thing. However, if the children are to be the contingent
" I. R. C., Sec. 22(b) (2) (A).
'6 Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, supra, n. 157.
10 See text, supra, ns. 125 to 127, p. 39.
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beneficiaries, this plan would not give assurance to the hus-
band that the policies will be kept in force.
Life Insurance - Taxable In Husband's Estate. To what
extent life insurance carried under a separation agreement
is taxable in the husband's estate is still an open question
in many of its aspects. If the proceeds are payable to the
executor to distribute in accordance with the agreement
they are probably includable for estate tax purposes.171
Likewise, even as to policies which have been absolutely
assigned to the wife, a strict reading of the Code sections
might lead to the conclusion that the insurance is includable
in the husband's estate where he has paid the premiums,
either directly, or indirectly by supplying the funds with
which the wife has made the payments, as well as where the
husband has retained an interest in the policies through a
provision in the agreement that if the wife does not survive
him the policies will revert to him.172 However, the Code
further provides that insurance proceeds receivable by
beneficiaries other than the estate, through policies trans-
ferred under conditions whereby the transaction was not a
taxable gift, shall not be included in the estate.73 Under
this Section the Commissioner has offered, at least tem-
porarily, a simple solution to the problem for those who can
lawfully make their separation agreement dependent upon
the granting of a divorce decree. If, under such circum-
stances, the divorce court approves the arrangement there
is no estate tax on the insurance proceeds. 4
Whether or not that Ruling can be relied on as finally
settling all that it seems to include, it is certainly true that
if the insurance is purchased in consideration of the release
of support rights there should be no problem. Thus, another
argument is presented in support of having two separate
agreements entered into at the time of divorce.
7 1. R. C., Sec. 811(g) (1).
12I1. R. C., Secs. 811(g) (2) (A) and 811(c) (3), respectively.
I. R. C., Sec. 811(g) (3).
"'Rev. Rut. 54-29, I. R. B. 1954-3. In a convenient, although perhaps not
wholly justified, reliance on the Harris decision in the Supreme Court, supra,
n. 144, the ruling is happily in favor of the taxpayer and, therefore, the
fundamental distinctions, as opposed to the superficial similarities, in the
two situations will undoubtedly be left to rest without further disturbance
by taxpayers' representatives.
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The insurance can be tied into the agreement relating
solely to the release of support rights. Of course, the Com-
missioner could still find that the allocation or segregation
of value attributed to the release of the support rights is
unreasonable. But any fair treatment of the problem might
well win the day in view of the impossibility of anyone else
coming up with a demonstrably more exact computation.'75
Summary - Separation Agreements
As the problems between spouses, and their relative in-
terests in different aspects of an agreement, vary so widely
it would now be presumptious to suggest what a planner
might consider as a standard of approach. However, there
are a few simple rules that might be considered as basic
principles upon which the remaining network could be spun.
It is probable that the husband will have the greater
income, taxable in higher brackets. Therefore, the emphasis
must be on obtaining for him every income tax deduction
available. The two will thereby have a larger net income
to work out between themselves.
When reconciliation has become impossible and a final
meeting of the minds has been reached, the divorce should
be sought promptly. There should be two agreements, in
writing.
The first, in consideration of the release of the wife's
right to support, should account for as much of the con-
sideration to be paid by the husband as possible. It should
contain all matters relating to whatever life insurance
arrangement there is contemplated.
The second agreement should cover the release of prop-
erty rights, using as little of the consideration to be paid
by the husband as seems reasonable.
1 Although methods and bases for granting alimony in different jurisdic-
tions vary greatly, it is traditional that alimony is to continue only during
the joint lives of the parties and even then only until the wife remarries.
In many separation agreements payments to the wife continue after the hus-
band's death and even sometimes in spite of her remarriage. Unless there
is no release of property rights whatsoever in the particular agreement it
would be easy for the Commissioner to argue that the extended payments
must have been agreed to for such release. The answer may be that the wife
is simply taking less over a longer period, but the problem is there.
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If the divorce is to be obtained in a jurisdiction where
the court is empowered to determine the division and
ownership of the parties' separate property, have the decree
approve and adopt the agreements and then make the
transfer. In fact, if there is no problem of public policy
when the agreements are negotiated and executed, the
transfer of the property should be made conditional upon
the granting of a divorce decree specifically approving and
ordering the transfer.
If the decree is to be obtained in a jurisdiction where
the court does not have such authority, make the particular
transfer in exchange for the release of property rights im-
mediately, and to this extent the marital deduction can be
availed of. Except for this, no more payments than neces-
sary should be made until after the decree.
It would be well to work out a plan whereby all pay-
ments that are to be made after the granting of the divorce
are included within a continuing pattern, so that they can
all, both large and small, be considered as integral and
related parts of a single arrangement for regular periodic
payments.
If either (a) the payments to the wife for the support
of each child are expected to exceed $600 a year, or (b)
in spite of the husband's payments the wife will contribute
over one-half the support of the children, do not separate
or segregate in any way the amounts to be used for their
support, or permit a mathematical computation thereof. If
payments are identifiable as exclusively for the support of
children the deduction is lost, but exemptions should then
be claimed for them as the husband's dependents.
As every effort is being made to reduce the husband's
tax burden as much as possible it must be remembered
that the wife's taxes will be necessarily increased thereby,
although not at the same rate. Thus, the payments to her
will have to be greater in order for her to be able to retain
the same net amount which she needs. In this respect, if
life insurance is to be used, the wife should apply for new
policies. If the husband is not insurable either the wife
should be designated irrevocable beneficiary, provided she
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survives, with full rights as owner in the meantime, includ-
ing the right to take the cash surrender value, or the exist-
ing policies should be assigned to her on the same basis.
In any event she should receive enough to carry the prem-
iums on the life insurance herself.
Payments to her should be in a sufficient amount so that
she can pay her own attorneys, who should bill separately
for their services relating to the alimony payment negotia-
tions. She would thereby get at least a partial deduction
for these expenses.
The method and breakdown of the alimony payments
will vary in every case, but preferably a periodic payment
arrangement, or otherwise instalment payments for a period
of more than ten years, will be essential for the tax plan.
As indicated above, instalment payments for less than ten
years, where also contingent upon the wife's remarriage,
that is, dependent "upon some elements of her own seem-
ingly unpredictable choosing.., far beyond the reach of an
educated guess", will be considered "periodic" in at least
one Circuit; but that acceptance is by no means uniform
as yet.
In view of the fact that the parties will probably wish
to reach final conclusions, leaving nothing to later determi-
nation or negotiation, as much flexibility as possible is de-
sirable. Times and the value of money can change so easily.
In many cases it would be well to have the payments to
the wife governed by some appropriate formula which could
be applied to the annual variations in the husband's net
income after federal and state income taxes. If based upon
such a formula the payments, again being unpredictable in
amount, will be considered as periodic even though for
less than ten years.
Of practical importance, however, regardless of any
other escalation provision is the fact that if a husband
through carelessness or design fails to make his periodic
payments regularly there can be some relatively disastrous
income tax results for the wife. If he defaults in his pay-
ments for a while and then brings everything up to date at
once the wife will be involved in a very high income tax
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bracket for that year; whereas, if the husband had made
his payments regularly the tax bite on the wife would have
been considerably less in the aggregate. Thus, it might be
well to insert in the agreement some penalty provision in
the event that the husband should fail to keep his payments
up, requiring, perhaps, that he shall reimburse the wife in
an additional amount equal to the increase in her income
taxes for the year in which any such accumulated payments
are received [the payments to include a coverage for any
tax on the amount of the reimbursement].
Although the agreement need not mention the immi-
nence or possibility of a divorce, it would probably be pref-
erable to have the agreement recite that it is not to preju-
dice either party in seeking a divorce, that if proceedings
are ever instituted by either party it is to be introduced in
evidence and urged upon the court for inclusion in the de-
cree, and if not made conditional on the granting of a decree
the agreement should provide that its terms are to survive
a divorce decree if ever granted to either party.
Likewise, the agreement does not have to be submitted
in evidence or be included in the decree or referred to by
the court. But it is preferable that the payment provisions
to the wife be affirmatively approved by the court and set
out in the decree.
Where it is intended by the parties that special mention
is to be given to the fact that the wife is to be liable for
income taxes on all payments received by her after the
decree, and that the husband shall have a deduction there-
for, it might be unwise to insert in the agreement an in-
demnity undertaking on the part of the wife in case the
courts hold the husband liable for any of the taxes. In all
probability he would be in higher brackets, and her in-
demnity payments might make things even worse. It would
be better for him simply to reduce future payments by the
amount of the tax which the wife would have paid had she
been taxable.
On the contrary, however, and perhaps worthy of par-
ticular consideration should be a provision in the agreement
relieving and indemnifying the wife from any payment on
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account of either gift or estate taxes. Where a transfer is
subsequently held to be a gift, there may be a substantial
tax, with interest and penalties payable. Whether as trans-
feree, or by consent under the gift tax marital deduction,
the wife would be liable.
Likewise, where a claim of the wife against the hus-
band's estate is valid and enforceable, and yet is not recog-
nized as a deduction for estate tax purposes because based
on a promise given in exchange for a release of property
rights, the double blow to the estate could well be crippling.
But that would not be the wife's fault and provision should
be made to protect her from any apportioned tax liability of
the husband's estate, or from being required to contribute
in any degree to the husband's estate tax.
INTERNAL REVENuE CODE, OF 1954
As indicated by references in the footnotes throughout
this article, a bill of great importance in the tax field has
recently been introduced in the Congress. It is known as
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [H. R. 8300].176
This new statute, if adopted, would completely rearrange
and renumber the sections of the present Internal Revenue
Code. It would also rewrite many of the existing provisions,
and enact many new ones.
As far as the limited subject matter of this article is con-
cerned, two of the significant changes would be the deletion
of the necessity of a court decree in order to have the special
alimony tax provisions become effective, and a rather com-
plete revision of the tax law relating to annuities, to which
attention has previously been called.
170 In view of the significance and wide scope of the pending provisions in
the proposed new legislation, the publication of BASIC ESTATE PLANNING,
mentioned in fn. * at p. 3, will be held up for appropriate revision to accord
with any final action taken by the Congress in connection therewith.
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